Many generations of cadets have studied the book The American Way of War by Russell Weigley. Written in 1973, the birth year smack in the middle of the GWOT Veteran cohort, the book is a history of American military strategy and policy. The book ends with a look at the Vietnam War, the first major failure of U.S. war policy in the modern era.
9 Flaws in the American Way of War
This book did not prepare me for what I was about to see as an officer commissioned just before the September 11 attacks. Here are some of the American ways of warfare that modern policymakers and senior commanders must understand based on lessons from 20 years of continuous war on multiple continents. These lessons are drawn from my direct observation of policy and strategy discussions in multiple capitals between elected and appointed policy makers and the ambassadors and generals that tried to influence and carry out that policy. These do not dispute the nine traditional principles of war, but they show how many are hamstrung.
1. Foreign policy is domestic.
Domestic politics will interfere with wise war policy. If you have any assumptions that the war policy coming from elected leaders is going to be based on what must be done to win quickly and efficiently, get rid of them. The decision-makers in every administration are elected or appointed leaders that are continuously thinking about re-election or the next election for their political party. That hesitancy to harm domestic politics will limit the wartime actions of the President, their Cabinet, and Congress.
2. Congress will punt.
The Executive and Legislative Branch control warfighting in different ways, but don’t expect Congress to step up if the President is stepping back. While Congress has the ability to help get the war policy right, they will often spend those opportunities scoring political points, instead of helping policymakers and leaders find and fund solutions. They also cannot be counted on to explain the war clearly to their constituents. That means the American people will have hundreds of different perspectives on the war based on their elected leaders’ views.
3. Trust is the coin of the realm, and it’s hard when you’re dead broke.
While soldiers’ success in battle will require that the rest of the U.S. government send people to lead their agencies that can develop trust with the rest of the foreign nation’s sectors…they won’t. The U.S. does not factor in trust-ability by other nations when we appoint people to conduct war, development, diplomacy, intelligence operations, or crimefighting. The key criteria for selection is does the U.S. President trust the person. That means many of the senior folks sent to work in war zones are either distrusted by the majority of the population or disliked by the leaders of the nation. This causes a massive rift in collaborating to improve security. In some cases, it cannot be overcome by battlefield success.
4. There won’t be unity of command.
The parts of the U.S. government deployed into a warzone will not agree on who is in charge. Those crafting the war policy, will not be wise enough to appoint one person as the leader of the effort—and even if they do, the other leaders will ignore that decision. That means the Ambassador and the Senior Military commander, and often the Chief of Station will all try to run their operations as if they are in charge of the policy. This means the U.S. citizens deployed will be pulled in multiple directions depending on where they work. Worst of all, it means the leaders of the foreign nation will be able to play “mom against dad” every single day and cause waste, fraud, and chaos if they choose to.
5. You won’t have the technology you need.
Every war that any army has ever entered has required them to develop solutions to problems they didn’t know existed, or didn’t care enough to tackle before. Technology gaps are normal. As you don’t get to choose your enemies in most wars, preparing to face every nation’s advantage over you is not possible. Prepare to make adjustments when you arrive and every day after that.
6. You will need allies, and they will disappoint you.
To accomplish your goals for the war, you will need friends. The friends you have will not all be willing to help you. Some of the ones you think the least of will surprise you and be your best ally. Nations you never even thought would care about your problems will step into the breach with you. Your coalition will be a mixed bag, but you will need them all for something. Prepare to be frustrated, but work through it.
7. We will invest slowly in security institutions that we need to allow us to withdraw.
Leaders and senior commanders seem to think killing bad guys wins wars. They won’t want to hear about the unsexy things you really need to do to win in the long run. They like the shiny special ops stuff too much. Be prepared to have the security sector reform work and force mentorship projects to be underfunded and misunderstood. You won’t have the money you need to do this right, or quickly. Focus all your energy on building a solid police force, military, and justice system, no matter how much DC asks you to do other things that won’t secure the peace. Be willing to get fired to make this a priority.
8. Our information operations will be underwhelming and senior leaders won’t know how to conduct it wisely.
In this age of information, senior leaders will not place enough emphasis on incorporating information into their strategy. Feed them the solutions and tell them every time you talk to them that it is our weakness and that we must do more. Getting them past a minimum effort will be a herculean effort for you. The war will hinge on using this domain wisely. Time is not your friend here, start immediately.
9. We won’t plan for peace building until it’s very hard to do.
All wars start for political (policy) reasons. All wars end by policy decisions and often by negotiation with some combatant in the war. While many on the Hill won’t want to think about diplomacy at first or even in the middle of the war, you must work to set the right conditions from the start. Don’t wait for diplomats to take the initiative, help them fall into negotiations by setting the table for them.
