Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century offers a detailed analysis of irregular warfare, defined as actions below the threshold of armed conflict, and its significance amid rising global crises and competition. This work by authors Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman emphasizes resilience and the integration of military, political, economic, and informational tools. The book explores how to build power, legitimacy, and influence while weakening those of adversaries.
Drawing from historical context and modern examples involving China and Russia, it critiques American strategic culture and calls for a more nuanced, whole-of-government approach. The work advocates a strategic shift that leverages all elements of national power to counter irregular threats and maintain long-term global influence.
America’s Return to Isolation
The end of World War II led to the handover of responsibility for the free world. The UK was on its way out, and the U.S. was begrudgingly on its way in to that seat. But Americans have had the luxury of two oceans and two neighbors that kept us safe from the majority of the world’s violence.
That isolationist mindset has been a key part of U.S. foreign policy for most of our nearly 250-year existence. Our presidents and legislators debate our role in the world each election. Today, it seems, we are entering another isolation era.
One Nation or World Police?
During our interventionist eras, the U.S. government created many organizations and doctrines to help other nations stabilize themselves. Critics can easily argue that the U.S. government is not very good at actually achieving the results of its interventionist policies. Those critics are not just Americans; they are also our NATO partners, Iraqis, Somalians, Afghans, Egyptians, Ukrainians, etc.
But there are also cases to be made by proponents of the idea that the U.S. can make our own country safer by having more free and stable nations as friends. Filipinos, South Koreans, Japanese, Italians, Germans, French, and maybe even Colombians and Vietnamese could tell us about the value and impact, over the long term, of our citizens infecting other cultures with our ideals of liberty, equality, and justice.
Hearts and Minds
The book Winning Without Fighting is a great primer for understanding our past experiences and, more importantly, laying out a Grand Strategy that both interventionists and isolationists can relate to. The idea that Americans can stay safe by working on a variety of issues that ensure we have more friends than enemies is not an idea most would argue against.
The authors closely examine our American way of strategizing and determine at this moment, irregular warfare efforts can increase America’s power, influence, and legitimacy in the world, while simultaneously decreasing our opponent’s capabilities. Their dive into the key irregular warfare efforts of military, economic, and informational statecraft offers options for policymakers to consider. There is also a focus on resilience at many levels.
In their recommendations, there are irregular warfare options that isolationists would use, like political warfare, economic sanctions, trade tools, and a focus on using our finite resources to build resilience. There are also options for interventionists, like military and security cooperation, economic assistance, and strengthening the international collective resilience.
Fighting the Bureaucracy, Not the Enemy
Winning without fighting is a simple concept, yet the simple becomes hard to do when many policymakers often stop those in the field from doing exactly what needs to be done. When DC intervenes too often with 5,000-mile-long screwdrivers, those on the frontline end up fighting without winning. Afghanistan is a prime example of that issue. DC constantly ignored military and diplomatic advice to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorism, and in the end, gutted the small irregular warfare efforts that could have resulted in a decades-long policy of outlasting the terrorists that resided in Pakistan.
Winning without fighting can work, but only if we focus on it and synchronize our strategies to keep the long-term efforts intact. Sadly, too many of the people on the ground overseas who actually understand the threats around the world will end up fighting the bureaucracy in DC instead of our common adversaries.
If more policymakers read this book, we might be able to stop fighting without winning.
