Often clearance holders master one aspect of their requirements immediately. They ask the simple question: What exactly am I protecting? While this might seem self evident, it is not. In fact, most disasters arrive because in a crisis, or unanticipated situation, not knowing the answer to this elementary question has led to failure and compromise.

Does anyone still believe the Soviets did not leave spies behind when the Red Army pulled out of Eastern Europe in the early 1990’s? Why not? After all, they were stationed in those countries, with near total control of the secret police apparatus for decades. This meant they had access to the identity of anyone who might be able to serve their interests either as a spy, an agent of influence, or as a secret assistant who could be called upon to deliver a document, drop a device in a hidden location, or provide money. In fact, many of these spies were already recruited, and left in place. But they were never forgotten. Additionally, the Soviets had access to names, biographies, career paths, and historical and family antecedents of anyone they cared to study, then later recruit or blackmail.

What am I protecting = who can i share it with?

A clearance holder needs to care about this because in knowing what he’s protecting, he also needs to know to whom it can be given, or with whom it can be shared. Considering how much emphasis is given to supply chain management and protection (protecting classified in its journey from idea to manufacture to delivery to you), you’d think that delivery from you to the next user, or end user, would receive equal attention. We should ask, ‘Once I’m finished with my work on this project, where does my responsibility end?’ It might not be one and the same. This is important, because let’s say you have a piece of communications gear. It is truly cutting edge, and said to be exceptional in its capability. Once it leaves your factory, where does it go?

In today’s joint battlefield, we confront new threats all the time. General Michael K. Nagata, U.S. Army Director for Strategic Operation Planning, points out that today all military branches must move from coordination, to collaboration, to integration. This is a cultural as well as military change. We need to share information, the better to fight together. But what about Allies and other partners in the mix? How far do we go to include them? After all, often we can’t do the mission without them. Can they use your communications equipment? Under what circumstances? What controls should there be?

Do any guidelines exist to help us know when we’ve done our job in protecting our now to be deployed weapon or other system? Of course there is the classification guide for your project, showing who can, and can’t, access the information. If you have access to a Foreign Disclosure Officer responsible for your project, he will guide you, too. If you are a small company, tap into your supporting security services, who can access the appropriate government people charged to know.

What does all this say about coordination with Allies? Remember, combat or deployment is not the time to wonder if we should have included allies, or NATO, or others in the use of our equipment, or not. Check to see what, if any, common data management scheme exists. Would it be worthwhile to access this, or these? If our deployed (here I’m speaking of Allies, not other services) warfare goal is to deploy and fight rapidly and effectively, this would go a long way toward that end. You can quickly synchronize plans this way, share intelligence rapidly, or as LTC David Doran argues, watch it die on the vine if you don’t know.

Remember, some of our allies might be spies. So be careful you are right about the proper deployment of your classified project. Make no shortcuts because, ‘Hey, this guy is ok’ or, ‘I’ve known him for years’. If directed to do something against known guidance, get it in writing. Whatever, get it right. If you speed up the right, most effective response in wartime, or cause it to be compromised, you might affect victory or defeat.

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John William Davis was commissioned an artillery officer and served as a counterintelligence officer and linguist. Thereafter he was counterintelligence officer for Space and Missile Defense Command, instructing the threat portion of the Department of the Army's Operations Security Course. Upon retirement, he wrote of his experiences in Rainy Street Stories.