The more things change, the more they stay the same. This is true of the ancient art of espionage as much as any other field of human endeavor. Only the technology has changed. The recent arrest of Ron Hansen on charges he worked for Chinese intelligence show that while things in our modern world have changed dramatically due to the advent of computers, some stay remarkably the same in the world of espionage. Why this is important to clearance holders must be understood, because adversarial intelligence agencies use these methods today.
Beware of Strangers (And Friends) Bearing Gifts
There was once a standard part of Cold War briefings which warned travelers to the former Communist countries of a devious plot. Our traveler would be taking a standard tour, say, of Prague, Czechoslovakia. While walking down Wenceslas Square, one of the main city attractions, a desperate looking woman would approach our American visitor. She had a letter in her hand, which she pressed upon our startled traveler. “Please sir,” she would implore, “Take this message to the West for me. It is the only way I can get information out about the evils of Communism! I’m a dissident who is fighting for freedom, and this is how I can get the truth to the Western press! Please sir, please.”
Shocked, and startled by an event seeming to demand an immediate response, the U.S. traveler wondered in a maze of confusion, ‘What should he do?’ What would you do?
We discovered that these approaches were, for the most part, provocations. Our traveler would tentatively take the message in all confidence. Then, without the slightest hesitation, he put it immediately in his pocket. He would carry it with him for the rest of his vacation, worrying himself sick throughout the rest of his visit. What had he just done? The ‘dissident’ disappeared as quickly as she’d appeared, and he had no way of knowing who she was or where she went.
As our visitor returned to the West, he had to pass through Czech customs. After a cursory check of his belongings, he would be directed to another room. He’d wait, and while he waited, he’d be consumed by doubt. He felt the document in his possession as if it were a fifty pound weight, waiting to convict him of something. After what was usually a long wait, the better to ‘have sadness set in’, he was finally approached by seemingly unsmiling Communist Czech customs officers and unknown men wearing plain clothes. Then he was asked if anyone had given him anything as a gift.
No, he responded. Then he’d be shown a photograph. There, for all the world to see, the desperate woman and he were apparently exchanging something in broad daylight on a Czech city square. “Explain this!” They demanded. “Let us see that document!” Finally, our beleaguered traveler surrendered the letter. Opened, it revealed not a letter alerting the Western press to the oppressions of Communism, but a secret Czech military document. “You are a spy!” the mysterious inquisitors would scream.
And then the adventure began. How this resolved itself is not germane to our consideration today. Rather, the conclusive lesson to be learned was, Never accept anything you don’t know the source of, nor can account for.
Using Family to Defy Export Laws
Move now to present day. In Hansen’s case, this procedure was simply reversed. Hansen was alleged to have been tasked to purchase sensitive, export denied electronic equipment for his Chinese spy handlers. He was directed to attend specialized technical conferences in the U.S, where he could buy items for his own American registered company. These items were specifically prohibited from export. There is an entire sub-system of security which explains what U.S. documentation is needed to export various items, which the Chinese spies knew better than most Americans. They therefore knew they needed a means of getting these electronic devices through use of a compliant American. Hansen did this for them.
Then came the problem of getting the purchased item out of the U.S. and to the spies in China. Hansen performed this requirement by asking a relative to carry it to China for him. Again, Hansen knew his action was contrary to export requirements, but did it anyway. He exploited the trust of his relative, and had him take this illicit export material out of the country to China.
The tactics of espionage have changed little. Here we have an illicit delivery made by unwitting people who trust a seemingly trustworthy source. It can be argued that this is a mitigating factor; that our deliverer didn’t know about the requirements to authorize overseas delivery through a comprehensive government procedure. Hansen did everything he could to have the information hand delivered, thus avoiding possible discovery by law enforcement either at the postal service, the customs check, or anywhere else. Hansen lied to his relative to get him to do a criminal act on his behalf.
Cleared contractors must remember never to deliver materials to any but authorized recipients. A named U.S. company may be listed as the recipient, but a check of their use of the equipment must insure that they are the ultimate user, not a cutout or go between for yet another recipient.
Oh, and another thing that never changes. Hansen did it for the money.
