Where preconceptions are most dangerous is when we aren’t aware of our own blind spots. What we might assume to be self-evident might be an error waiting to be applied. Any analyst knows that unexamined preconceptions applied to the study of the threat to a classified program can be lethal. We who must assess the threat documents prepared for our classified programs should be equally as attentive to how we approach a subject. We can’t let our pre-judgements to get in the way. Since a genuine attempt to dispel preconceptions applies whether we are the analysts or the receivers of such intelligence, both must pause to reflect on why.
The Spy is Often Who You Least Expect
Here are three examples that reeked of bias or prejudice.
1. The secretary has more access to the atomic bomb than anyone suspected.
A British secretary for a blandly titled company dealing with ferrous metals would steal into her boss’s office after he went home for the day. She would dutifully open his safe, and photograph as many documents as she could. Closing the safe, she forwarded whatever that day’s collection consisted of to her Soviet handler. The significance of this industrial espionage would not be known for another fifty years. The company was actually one of the early research facilities for what would later become the atomic bomb. No one outside cleared personnel knew this, but the Soviets had become aware of it through the actions of this secretary, Melita Norwood. She could have been stopped early, because she was taken under suspicion by the insightful investigative observations of the first female agent of the British home counterespionage department, MI-5. Norwood was suspected, but regrettably the agent’s report was ignored. The agent’s report fell afoul of the MI-5 brotherhood, which couldn’t imagine a female spy, a secretary no less, reported on by a woman to boot! Thus Norwood continued to spy for the Soviets for 40 years. Her treachery was revealed by a Russian defector, only after her retirement in 1997.
2. Prejudice can lead you to the wrong suspect.
Alfred Dreyfus was accused of espionage by his French military colleagues, largely based on their blind prejudice against Jewish soldiers in the French Army. The actual spy, a fellow officer named Esterhazy, was not exposed for years. Esterhazy’s espionage was thus unwittingly protected by blind fear of the ‘other’, a fear which led French counterintelligence investigators to totally false conclusions and the arrest of Dreyfus.
3. Bias against a messenger leads to events like 9/11.
In our own country we realize such preconceptions as well. Recall the FBI field office female agent who reported on the odd events at a local airport near Minneapolis. In the latter part of the 1990’s, in an era of heightened concern over recent Osama bin Laden-originated terrorism, she reported on a Middle Eastern man taking commercial airline training. What made this particularly strange was the man only wanted to learn to fly, but not to land. Since her report to headquarters was not followed up on, one of the hijackers of an aircraft used on the 9/11 was not investigated.
Sifting Through the Information
We all know that we can find ourselves in a blizzard of information. I’ve cited several cases here where prejudice against women, against foreigners, against the inexperienced or those outside the mutually admiring in-crowd were ignored. In each case, disaster followed. We who are at higher levels of command or supervision, or who must read what others write, analyze and conclude, are responsible for what we accept as true. For example, if we say this adversary has a capability of breaking into our computer system, do we also say he has a reasonable motive? We’ve noted North Korea has great capabilities in cyber theft. We now know that they will quite literally attack anyone where they can get a great ransom, because that has become part of their gross national product.
Consider the Russians. For several Cold War generations, we considered them our enemies who would recruit left-wing socialists, or liberal minded authors, academics, and politicians to serve their purposes. This prejudice is still with us. However, we now see that they will recruit anyone, regardless of political opinion, to serve modern Russian interests. The young Marina Bukovina claimed to be a ‘gun rights’ advocate to insert herself into influential political circles in America, for instance. She was a mole; planted with influential right-wing advocates to better serve Russian interests. Times change, and espionage methods can shape shift in order to accomplish a national interest. Watch carefully.
Remove Bias and Prejudice
There is no circumstance which today permits preconceptions. Threats to our programs have come from those who are otherwise known as deeply religious or who wanted to help their boyfriend. Any strange combination of motives and needs populate our current threat environment. Never dismiss a tip without first finding our whether there is a grain of truth in it. Once you sit down to read a threat document, be sure there is no engrained prejudice. The document itself might be the cause of your program’s downfall.
