China’s latest paid agent is heading to prison for 20 months, having been sentenced in Federal court on November 7. Shapour Moinian, a former U.S. Army helicopter pilot, filed his SF-86 in 2017 and March 2020 with omissions and falsehoods, concerning his clandestine relationship with China.
Moinian, arrested in February 2022, pled guilty to both accusations, and agreed to cooperate with the government. The sentence he received may be perceived as lenient, but it may be an indicator as to the level of cooperation the government received from Moinian.
What the Department of Justice tells us is that Moinian worked for a cleared defense contractor on “various aviation projects used by the military and U.S. intelligence agencies, he was contacted by an individual in China who claimed to be working for a technical recruiting company. This person offered Moinian the opportunity to consult for the aviation industry in China.”
“In March 2017, Moinian travelled to Hong Kong where he met with this purported recruiter and agreed to provide information and materials related to multiple types of aircraft designed and/or manufactured in the United States in exchange for money. Moinian accepted approximately $7,000-$10,000 in U.S. currency during that meeting. According to his plea agreement, at this meeting and at all subsequent meetings, Moinian knew that these individuals were employed or directed by the PRC.”
China’s “consulting gig” MO
China repeatedly and successfully uses the consulting gig modus operandi, as described above, where they seek out experts in fields where there is an intelligence requirement in China. Every FSO should ensure a robust discussion about the MO to their cleared constituency during the annual CI briefing.
The fact that Moinian hid the contact and did not include the foreign travel/engagement on his SF-86 underscores how he absolutely knew that what he was doing was deleterious to the interests of the United States.
His Chinese handlers issued him “a cell phone and other equipment … communicate with them and aid in the electronic transfer of materials and information.” Again, the issuance of a device is a clear indicator of the PRC’s intelligence officers attempt to keep the relationship clandestine and out of sight of his employer and government counterintelligence efforts. It also is an indicator that the individual is willingly collaborating.
Indicators that Moinian was fully collaborative:
- Moinian was responsive to tasking
- He provided sensitive information to China
- Moinian used PRC issued communications devices to reduce face-to-face engagement
- He directed China to pay him via a Korean bank account owned by a family member
- He received remuneration for completed tasks
- Moinian lied on his SF-86 about both foreign travel/relationships
The parallels to the case of Kevin Mallory should not be ignored. Mallory was approached by China and offered a consulting engagement. He was then issued similar communications devices for the purposes of communicating with his handlers and to avoid having his device contain breadcrumbs or communications between China and Mallory which would indicate he had a clandestine relationship.
We say it often and we’ll say it again, every employee must be prepared to be approached by a hostile intelligence service and know how to react when the approach occurs. You the individual do not choose whether or not you are a target. The adversary makes that decision.
