We often imagine ‘clues’ of possible espionage are only discovered in appropriately dark and rainy streets. In fact, just the opposite is true. We might discover that something is amiss by our awareness of the most common daily occurrences. Take for instance the ‘lead’ developed when a plastic model airplane came on the market in 1986. The model was a speculation on what a radar transparent fighter might look like. It was remarkably similar to a real aircraft under the tight wraps of classified development. The Air Force had to reckon with the fact that a private airplane model company was closely following its development programs. They had to tighten their controls.

The real F-117s were transferred at night sealed inside the bellies of gigantic C 5A transports to a testing sight in the vast American West. With concern for secrecy, even the testing itself was conducted at night, for almost five years. Only one photograph of this secret aircraft, indeed its existence, was released during its later development. That photo was not made known until the decision was made to fly the fighter during the day. It has been left to history to compare the reality to the model.

Why cleared program managers should note this is because we can be compromised anywhere. In fact, spies, adversarial companies, news media, and the general public are simply interested in what you are trying to hide. One story can stand for all.

During the lead up to the invasion of France on D-Day, panic gripped the Allied planners. A crossword puzzle in the London Daily Telegraph carried potentially compromising words. “Juno, Gold, Omaha, Utah and Sword” were beaches for the planned invasion. Each of these were words found in daily crosswords in May 1944, just prior to the giant invasion. Together with the appearance of Mulberry (the temporary harbor) and Neptune (the naval operations phase), the counterintelligence services were apoplectic. No doubt, they concluded, a spy was sending information to the Germans! Then, when the crossword clue was ‘Big-Wig’, and the word itself ‘Overlord’, the code name for D-Day, they pounced. The editor admitted he’d used them, but unknowingly. How he got them is the point of this parable. Seems a 14-year-old boy overheard these words spoken among troops at army camps scattered around London. Soldiers spoke freely, never fearing the boy was a ‘spy’, just a young boy listening to ever fascinating soldier talk. He took some of the words and filled in the blanks on his older friend’s puzzle. No spies, but potential compromise all the same.

Awareness can be helped by each of the traditional security disciplines. We need to guard how our information is shared, especially in this day of massive information overload. We also should do the obvious physical security measures, to keep even wandering boys out of where they might compromise something, albeit innocently. This is not to say, by the way, that an intrepid corporate spy wouldn’t pay a young lad money to ask the right question of unsuspecting people. But every cleared workplace should employ a basic Operations Security (OPSEC) check. Questions which often arise here are how are your conferences pre-briefed? How are your travelers advised before going abroad? Is this trip necessary?

These various ‘checks’ each describe whole processes. Not only your supporting defense intelligence agencies and security personnel can help. You can also find plenty of resources and guidance online through the Department of Homeland Security, not to mention your FBI support. Avail yourself of these people, and these online programs.

Be sure before you disregard something as a coincidence, to determine by whom and how it happened. One entire, long-prepared surveillance was cancelled when after days without seeing the subject appear at the door, it was determined there was a second entrance to the location that he was using. No spy compromised the surveillance. Poor planning compromised the mission. Someone should have checked on access points first. Begin from the simplest solution before looking for spies. Maybe we did it to ourselves.

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John William Davis was commissioned an artillery officer and served as a counterintelligence officer and linguist. Thereafter he was counterintelligence officer for Space and Missile Defense Command, instructing the threat portion of the Department of the Army's Operations Security Course. Upon retirement, he wrote of his experiences in Rainy Street Stories.