I’ve learned a lot about human nature over a decade in law practice, including that very few things in life are uniformly intuitive or obvious. What I assume goes without saying may require explanation for someone else, and vice versa.
One of the most surprising of these revelations stems from the application all security clearance applicants complete, the SF-86 (or soon-to-be “PVQ”). The form includes sections for listing any dual citizenship and foreign contacts – including biographical, contact, and employment information for the latter.
As it turns out, many applicants are so focused on completing the form as completely as possible that they miss the big picture: their security clearance (or application for a clearance) makes them a target for foreign intelligence services. The last thing one would want to do is alert foreign intelligence services to the opportunity. But that’s exactly what a lot of applicants unwittingly risk doing.
This happens either by: contacting a foreign embassy or consulate to renounce dual citizenship for the stated purpose of obtaining a security clearance; contacting foreign contacts to obtain personal information for the stated purpose of completing a security clearance application; or both. It is entirely possible that the information never makes its way to a foreign intelligence service, but it is also entirely possible that it does. Once that information is provided, it is impossible to know where it goes or whose hands it ends up in for potential exploitation.
Of course, few people renounce dual citizenship without a reason, so foreign governments may be able to venture a guess about security clearance, regardless. That is why I generally recommend not renouncing dual citizenship for the sake of obtaining a clearance without first seeking guidance from the cognizant federal agency’s security office. In many cases, the renunciation is not necessary to obtain the clearance.
As for friends, extended family, and other foreign contacts, truthfully listing “unknown” for the requested details usually suffices and averts the risk. Investigators will ask for more information if it is necessary.
In fairness to the folks who make this mistake, there is really no reason why the government couldn’t or shouldn’t pre-emptively alert applicants to the issue. Indeed, a couple agencies do, but it isn’t the norm. The reaction among agencies to the revelation that the applicant alerted a foreign government or contacts to their security clearance status is equally inconsistent. Some agencies are nonplussed over the issue, while others react very negatively and construe the decision as reflective of disqualifying poor judgment. The best approach is usually the highest common denominator; when in doubt, ask security officials before acting.
This article is intended as general information only and should not be construed as legal advice. Although the information is believed to be accurate as of the publication date, no guarantee or warranty is offered or implied. Laws and government policies are subject to change, and the information provided herein may not provide a complete or current analysis of the topic or other pertinent considerations. Consult an attorney regarding your specific situation.
