There are two aspects of the federal personnel security vetting policy that have bothered me for some time now. Under the 2012 Federal Investigative Standards (FIS), there are five types of federal background investigations (Tiers 1 through 5). Each investigative tier is for a different level of clearance and has its standard scope and period of coverage (POI). Each appears to have its own expansion criteria, defined by the FIS’s Expandable Focused Investigation (EFI) Models.
Expandable focused investigations
The scope of an investigation is its breadth—the number and type of investigative actions, such as employment, education, and residence record checks/reference interviews; police and court record checks; character reference interviews; credit bureau reports; and national agency checks. The POI can go back 3, 5, 7, 10 years or longer, depending on the type of investigation and the specific investigative action within each type of investigation. When a potentially disqualifying issue is disclosed in a security form or is developed during a standard investigation, an EFI can be initiated. The scope of the EFI will depend on established EFI thresholds for each type of issue within each type of standard investigation. The exact expansion criteria defined in the EFI are not publicly available, because the 2012 FIS, including the EFI, are “For Official Use Only.” However, I’ve read enough investigative reports to deduce that there are lower thresholds for initiating an EFI on Tier 5 (Top Secret) investigations than for Tier 3 (Secret) investigations. For example, a lower amount of bad debt in a Tier 5 investigation will trigger an EFI as compared to a Tier 3 investigation. If my observations are correct, EFI expansion criteria are incorrectly based on risk. Although individuals with Top Secret clearances present a greater risk than those with Secret clearances; it makes no sense to apply risk management principles, once a potentially disqualifying condition is identified.
disclose the facts
This same faulty logic is used in Security Executive Agent Directive 3 (SEAD 3)—“Reporting Requirements for Personnel with Access to Classified Information or Who Hold a Sensitive Position.” There are more reporting requirements for people with access to Top Secret information (Critical Sensitive Positions), than for people with access to Secret information (Non-Critical Sensitive Positions). The following are examples of things people with Secret clearances are not required to report, but people with Top Secret clearances are required to report:
- Direct involvement in foreign business.
- Foreign bank accounts.
- Ownership of foreign property
- Voting in a foreign election.
- Adoption of non-U.S. citizen children.
- Any unusual infusion of assets of $10,000 or more.
- Foreign National Roommate(s).
- Cohabitant(s).
- Marriage.
Except for “Any unusual infusion of assets of $10,000 or more,” these events would have to be reported by everyone with national security eligibility in the “Application for National Security Positions” (Standard Form 86—SF86) they are required to submit every five years. It’s doubtful that any of these events would surface through “Continuous Evaluation” (CE) checks. This means that the Government might never know about a large wire transfer of funds into a Secret clearance holder’s bank account from a foreign source unless it is flagged by the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). A full five years could go by before the government is aware that a Secret clearance holder voted in a foreign election, purchased foreign property, or became involved in a foreign business.
The EFI and SEAD 3 are not consistent with the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines in Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (SEAD 4). SEAD 4 applies equally to everyone in a sensitive national security position regardless of their level of classified access or the sensitivity level of their position. Similarly, applicants for Secret clearances and Top Secret clearances answer the same questions on the SF86. It makes little sense to require Secret clearance holders to report less potentially disqualifying information under SEAD 3 than Top Secret clearance holders are required to report.
the price of secrets
Risk management supports less expensive investigations for Secret clearances than for Top Secret clearances. Currently, a Tier 5 investigation for a Top Secret clearance is about 13 times more expensive than the Tier 3 investigation for a Secret clearance ($4,435 vs. $345). However, reporting requirements and investigative expansion criteria need to be the same for clearance holders at all levels of access and position sensitivity, so that potentially disqualifying issues can be identified, investigated, and adjudicated equally for all national security eligibility. Once a potentially disqualifying issue is known either through SEAD 3 reporting or a standard investigation, the issue should be pursued and fully developed through an EFI that uses the same expansion thresholds for Tier 3 and Tier 5 investigations.
People with Top Secret clearances are not required to be more trustworthy than people with Secret clearances. You’re either trustworthy or you’re not. The same set of fact circumstances should not result in the granting of a Secret clearance to one person and the denial of a Top Secret clearance to another. If a person with a Secret clearance acquires property or becomes involved in a business in a foreign country, this information needs to be reported to government security officials immediately, not in a few years when the person is required to complete a new SF-86. If a certain dollar amount of delinquent debt is worth pursuing to develop the information surrounding the financial problem of a Top Secret clearance applicant, the same (not higher) dollar amount of delinquent debt should trigger an EFI for a Secret clearance applicant.
The case for similar costs
Before SEAD 3, which became effective in June 2017, self-reporting requirements were the same for people with Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret clearances. Additional reporting requirements existed for personnel with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Until 2004, when the Defense Security Service was still using its own investigative procedures and had responsibility for the majority of security clearance investigations, case expansion criteria were the same for all types of security clearance investigations. During the time that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had responsibility for the majority of security clearance investigations, with a few exceptions, they also used the same investigative expansion criteria regardless of clearance level.
It is a false economy and bad risk management to use a tiered system of reporting under SEAD 3 and a tiered system of case expansion under the FIS EFI Models. The benefits far outweigh the minimal added costs of using the same reporting standards and the same EFI criteria for all levels of security eligibility.
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William H. Henderson is a former Army Counterintelligence Agent and a retired federal clearance investigator. In 2007 he began helping clearance applicants from the pre-application stage through representation at hearings and appeals. Since 2012, he’s been the Principal Consultant at the Federal Clearance Assistance Service (FEDCAS). His first two books on security clearances have been used at five universities and colleges. He recently published the 2nd Edition of Issue Mitigation Handbook. He’s contributed scores of articles to ClearanceJobs.com, and he’s been retained as an expert witness in several state and federal lawsuits.
