The National Counterintelligence Security Center (NSCS) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), together with other members of the FVEY Alliance (United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) issued a joint counterintelligence notice highlighting the PRC’s continued efforts to bolster the capabilities of the PRC by exploiting the knowledge of current and former military personnel.
International efforts
The joint notice follows the U.S., NATO, and partner country conference involving over 120 officials to discuss these PLA efforts. China has been targeting U.S. technologies, specifically in the military aviation sector, using clandestine intelligence recruitment methodologies to include the use of commercial cover and social networks (LinkedIn specifically) for many years. Unfortunately for the West, with good results.
The bulletin touches on several cases in recent years which we have highlighted in Clearance Jobs. In October 2022, we wrote of the UK’s Ministry of Defence having issued a warning that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was actively recruiting former helicopter and fixed wing pilots, in “UK Issues Threat Alert That China is Actively Recruiting Western Military Pilots.” Given the continued efforts by China, the NCSC reiterates and highlights the use of third-party intermediaries by China to spot, assess, recruit, and hire aviators and other personnel involved with military aviation. The notice calls attention to the fact that he Chinese approach is adaptive and directly calls out the PRC goal to obtain western expertise in order to enhance the effectiveness of the PLAAF and Navy aviators.
CI at work
Counterintelligence leads will want to share the notice with their constituent personnel, with particular attention paid to indicators, impact and mitigation.
- Key indicators:
- Contact may be via acquaintances, recruiters, emails, LinkedIn and other professional job platforms
- Job offers from private companies whose ties with the PLA are hidden
- Locations – Not limited to China and South Africa
- Targeting more than just pilots. Flight engineers, operations center personnel, technical experts
- Impact:
- Advance China’s military expertise
- Increases the risk “of future conflict by reducing our deterrence capabilities”
- Individual legal peril (Marine pilot indicted in violating the U.S. Arms Export Control Act)
- Mitigation:
- Be mindful of the methods of approach
- Avoid contact/interaction with those former service members involved with companies engaged with the PLA/PLAAF
- Avoid TMI – posting too much detail about one’s experiences which draws the attention of the PLA
- If it is too good to be true, requires keeping it secret, or obfuscates who is the customer – report
U.S personnel – report an approach
The notice urges personnel who have been recruited or who find themselves targeted for recruitment in the future to initiate contact:
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Contact the Tip Line; local FBI field office, Legal Attache at U.S. Embassy; or the Counterintelligence Task Force via email: ncitf@fbi.gov
- S. Air Force/U.S. Space Force: Contact OSI – Submit a Tip
- S. Navy/U.S. Marines: Contact NCIS – Submit a Tip
- S. Army: Submit an iSALUTE Suspicious Activity Report or call 1-800-CALL-SPY (1-800-225-5779) (CONUS ONLY)
