Recently, an American General Officer observed that the long development time of major weapons systems would not be adequate to respond to modern threats. With some systems taking over ten years from design, through manufacture, to deployment, we’d no longer be able to respond with the adaptability now required by modern warfare, as in the Ukraine. A further commentator noted that one ship being built by the Navy has required 85% redesign while under construction. Such stories are common. They are also not being addressed. A further concern among defense industry teams is the expense.
A strategic lack of transparency
Previously, growing expenses were always a given. Now we find an additional money-draining concern which only recently raised its head. Why should we spend millions on missiles to defeat threats like drones, or high-explosive rockets which only cost thousands to build and deploy? Surely there has to be a better way. This is where classified information comes in. Who among us hasn’t discerned how this works?
All of these questions are being addressed, but the answer is not going to be shared at major weapons conferences or university seminars. Classified solutions are in the works, but the means, ends, and locations of where these are being made are not in the public domain. Of course, we also know that such solutions will be leaked, either maliciously through spies or information brokers or inauspiciously through careless adherence to good Operations Security.
Shapeless issues
The first problem is evolving and changing like a lava lamp. Take for instance the recent spy exchange orchestrated by numerous countries in Europe and America. Some of the Russian spies were long-time illegals, living a false identity, the better to collect information as if they were actually from a Western country. Their mission would normally be directed at collecting classified designs, plans, and similar preliminary information in secret developments. Further, they would be placed to know not just capabilities, but also intentions. They would be the long-term, well-placed secret sharer who could tell what we are protecting, and how we intend to use it. We read endless articles on hypersonic weaponry these days. What spies are hoping to divine is what, of their own country’s capabilities, these weapons are being designed to destroy.
Let us not forget the other spies; saboteurs. These are people whose job it is to destroy the place of production. Middle European countries have suffered already from unexplained explosions that rock fuel and weapons cantonment areas. The spies who do that have been traced to Russia, who’ve set upon these plants and ammunition storage areas because they are resupply points for their adversary Ukraine. The Russians don’t care that Western countries are attacked on their soil by these saboteurs. Their calculations have thus far been safe; no Western nation has declared a single such Russian act as an act of war. Indeed, U.S. bases in Europe have been alerted to prepare for possible sabotage.
Secrets on display
Secondly, we need to protect our classified programs from inadvertent revelations. Huge military conferences and exhibitions occur often in the West. Military defense companies vie for huge federal grants and contracts, not only here but in other NATO countries as well. How well are the unclassified components of major weapon systems protected? Just walking into such exhibitions or conferences requires admission, but how is that controlled? Next, all the displays at weapons exhibitions are there for anyone to see. I often ask myself, who is seeing this? Who is photographing such displays? What does this display reveal about a weapon? These and a host of other questions can be raised, and are. Have all the displays been checked to ensure they reveal nothing not already known? Have they been double-checked to ensure locations where built, contact persons, and others deeply involved with the project are protected as necessary?
For instance, one company gladly handed out information about all its team members on a classified project. All they should have done was refer any inquiries to their public affairs office, which would further direct any follow-up calls. The public affairs team will have been briefed completely on what they could and could not reveal. So, how about questions for the staff manning the booth? We all know this is why people go to these exhibitions in the first place. Are the briefers controlled, and know what they can and can’t speak about? Have all your major public speakers at the convention had their speeches vetted for release? We can’t do enough to protect what we don’t want released, and there are so many out there wanting to compromise our work.
Conferences are major events that draw some of the finest minds together. They also draw some of the best spies. Oh, and at the end of the day, for some spies, information brokers, business competitors, and those who wish to do us harm, they are only starting. They know where the restaurants, bars, and clubs are that attract the finest minds at the conferences. They’ll meet them there.
