China continues to pursue the acquisition of human expertise to advance their knowledge of key technologies which they cannot yet generate at the required speed or quality internally. In other words, they continue to use their cash to induce those with sensitive knowledge to travel to China and share. The newest expression of that strategy is their Bounty‑as‑a‑Service (BaaS) process. This state‑directed effort is successfully acquiring experienced‑based knowledge that accelerates development timelines across dual‑use technologies. This iteration is targeting advanced semiconductor tooling. Specifically the knowledge necessary to build an Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography prototype.
According to a Rueters report, which appeared in the South China Morning Post, China has successfully activated a EUV prototype, years ahead of when western analysts had expected such a breakthrough. The report notes that this work took place within a highly secure facility in Shenzhen. The piece notes that former ASML engineers were recruited through offshore intermediaries and moved into the program under alias and state-managed identities at the facility.
The South China Morning Post, in a separate article identified Lin Nan as the individual who led a team from the Chinese Academy of Sciences Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics in cracking the barrier to home-grown advanced chips for China. Nan, previously served as ASML’s head of light source technology in the Netherlands.
Nan returned to China is 2021 as part of a national talent acquisition program (the successor to Thousand Talents).
Others, who have been recruited are brought in as contractors, for short‑duration technical lift and then returned home. The relationship is transactional. As noted, they work under an alias name provided by the PRC in a sealed facility.
A Pattern of Targeting Tacit Knowledge
The Shenzhen reporting is not an isolated anomaly. It reflects a long‑running pattern in which China seeks out the tacit, experience‑based knowledge held by a small number of highly specialized engineers, pilots, scientists, and technicians—expertise that cannot be replicated internally and is best acquired through offshore recruitment, intermediaries, and short‑duration technical engagements.
The Cutout Architecture: A Proven Model
The structure mirrors an earlier precedent: the PLA Air Force’s recruitment of former NATO fighter pilots through South African cutouts. In that case, the intermediaries handled outreach, contracting, travel, and cover stories. The pilots trained PLAAF aviators in advanced tactics and safety procedures—skills China could not produce internally.
The semiconductor domain now exhibits the same operational signatures:
- Third‑country consultancies and shell firms in Singapore, Dubai, and Eastern Europe
- Alias‑based onboarding to obscure Western identities
- Offshore contracting followed by movement into PRC‑controlled facilities
- Short‑term, high‑value engagements focused on tacit knowledge transfer
The objective is identical: acquire the human experience that collapses development timelines.
It may be a coincidence, a patent search showed that during Nan’s tenure at ASML (2015-2021) he was associated with hundreds of patents, many of which are associated with EUV lithography. Between 2023-2024, he and his team filed eight EUV light source patents.
It should be clear to all, China is not stealing blueprints. China is recruiting the people who know how to make the blueprints.
Independent Intelligence: What We Know Beyond Reuters
Dutch military intelligence (MIVD) has independently assessed that China targets Dutch semiconductor, aerospace, and maritime industries to strengthen the PLA. The methods include cyber espionage, insider recruitment, acquisitions, and export‑control evasion. This is separate from the Shenzhen EUV reporting and reinforces the broader pattern: China seeks Western knowledge it does not yet possess.
A separate Dutch investigation found that ASML equipment has been sold to entities with links to the Chinese military, underscoring the dual‑use nature of the technology ecosystem China is pursuing.
These independent sources confirm the strategic intent, even if they do not identify individual recruits.
Why This Matters for FSOs
For Facility Security Officers and security leaders, the implications are clear:
- The threat is targeted, not broad‑based. China is pursuing specific individuals with high‑impact, experience‑based knowledge.
- Traditional insider‑threat models are insufficient. IRM programs are not designed to detect the offshore components of recruitment. The outreach, the cutout, the negotiation, the interview, or the contracting, because those activities may occur entirely outside the enterprise environment. But if any part of that engagement touches corporate systems, such as emails routed through corporate servers, personal accounts hosted on corporate infrastructure, or unusual access patterns tied to preparation activity, a properly tuned IRM program should detect it. However, scuttlebutt and collegial discusion among colleagues may also provide opportunity for the IRM to be informed, under the doctrine of “see (or hear) something, say something.).
- Dual‑use expertise is the center of gravity. The same engineer who improves commercial yield also improves defense‑grade microelectronics.
- Alias‑based recruitment obscures visibility. The operational environment limits independent verification, even when the activity is ongoing.
China is hunting for individuals with key knowledge
China’s Bounty‑as‑a‑Service model is not about ideology. It is about acceleration. As I wrote in 2008, in Secrets Stolen, Fortunes Lost, each company hasprocess and procedures surrounding and protecting their life blood , intellectual property and an unscrupulous adversary will attempt to leapfrog their technological state of play by any means at their disposal.
The question is no longer whether China is pursuing Western expertise. The question is whether organizations understand which people fall within China’s targeting matrix and whether those individuals are properly briefed on how to recognize and rebuff an approach.
