There has been speculation for several years that quantum computing would deliver a revolutionary advance, capable of solving complex problems exponentially faster than classical computers. It could also tackle problems that have so far been too complex for even the most powerful supercomputers. That has the potential to design new technologies, but there are also concerns that it could break virtually all current encryption, threatening sensitive data, financial systems, and critical infrastructure.
2025 has been described as the year of “Quantum Awareness,” with the United Nations designating it the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology—an initiative aimed at fostering international partnerships.
In a 2025 update, The Quantum Insider identified 2026 as the Year of Quantum Security, “a coordinated, year-long global effort focused on post-quantum cryptography, quantum resilience, and the responsible protection of quantum technologies and the intellectual property that underpins them.”
It officially launched on Monday, initiating a deliberate shift in emphasis for the emerging technology.
“Given the nature of quantum technology, every year is a ‘year of quantum security’ since the fundamental drivers behind its development have always involved cryptanalysis,” Dr. Jim Purtilo, associate professor of computer science at the University of Maryland, told ClearanceJobs.
“The framing is marketing, but the underlying urgency is real,” added Michael Bell, CEO of Suzu Labs.
Greater Focus on Security
Whereas 2025 may have been the year to acknowledge quantum computing and its potential to drive significant change, 2026 will now be the year-long global effort, backed by the FBI and NIST, to align policy, security practices, and coordination across the quantum ecosystem. The goal is also to focus on post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum resilience, and IP protection.
This effort comes as the White House is expected to release critical executive action mandates on quantum cybersecurity and PQC security.
Too often, cybersecurity has had to play catch-up with emerging technology, and in the case of PQC, that would be a critical mistake.
“It’s about time we woke up,” warned Lt. Gen. Ross Coffman, U.S. Army (Retired), president of Forward Edge-AI.
“The IC community identified this threat years ago,” Coffman told ClearanceJobs via email, suggesting that Washington is actually taking it as seriously as it demands.
“For the FBI and NIST to get behind the Year of Quantum Security, it means they are putting the full power of the purse and policy behind protecting the US against clear and present danger. This is a significant step for cybersecurity in a post-quantum world. It affects every vertical – not just the military,” added Coffman. “It’s cliché to say that everyone from Main St. to Wall St. needs PQC protection, but it affects your grandma’s ATM.”
Suzu Lab’s Bell also suggested that whether 2026 is specifically “the year” matters less than whether organizations are treating this as a now problem rather than a someday problem.
“Many are not,” Bell told ClearanceJobs, noting that recent surveys show nearly half of enterprises in North America and Europe haven’t integrated quantum computing into their cybersecurity strategies.
“Mid-sized organizations are particularly vulnerable, with 56% admitting they aren’t prepared. That gap between threat awareness and actual preparation is what initiatives like this are trying to close,” Bell continued. “The practical threat isn’t when quantum computers can break encryption. The practical threat is ‘harvest now, decrypt later.'”
A Race to the Post Quantum World
The United States is far from alone in its efforts to develop quantum technology and in preparing for PQC.
“Other countries in Asia have sped up post-quantum cybersecurity adoption because they live next door to the largest cybersecurity threat. They know it will take a year to implement,” explained Coffman, who added that his firm has already developed plug-and-play hardware that can provide a practical path to compliance. “The government began the post-quantum migration years ago, and we’ve proven that path works, across land, air, sea, and space.”
A significant concern is that potential adversaries are already collecting encrypted data, assuming they’ll be able to decrypt it later.
“For data that remains sensitive for years or decades, including health records, legal archives, government communications, and intellectual property, the window to act is now, not when quantum computers are operational,” said Bell. “Timeline estimates for cryptographically relevant quantum computers range from five years for nation-state actors to 2030-2050 for broader availability. That uncertainty is exactly why preparation needs to start during the awareness phase.”
Therefore, addressing security before full deployment is precisely the right approach.
“The alternative is what we’ve seen with every other major technology transition: bolt security on after the fact and spend years cleaning up preventable problems,” said Bell, who noted that NIST has been standardizing post-quantum cryptography algorithms specifically so organizations can begin migration before the threat materializes. In addition, DHS has released roadmaps to help organizations prepare.
“The January 12 launch event in Washington includes FBI, CISA, and NIST specifically because federal agencies are treating this as operational guidance, not theoretical discussion,” Bell explained. “The cryptographic transition from current algorithms to quantum-resistant alternatives will take years to complete. Complex systems have cryptographic dependencies embedded throughout their infrastructure, supply chains, and third-party integrations. Starting early means the transition can be methodical rather than panicked.”
