Determining intentions and capabilities are critical in the secret world. How this information is determined is what makes diplomacy work. Let’s see how this works. Those who follow events in the Middle East, such as organizations with access to some American classified programs, will agree that there is an almost Kabuki Theater quality to international relations there. The grandstanding, which threatens doom itself for the actions taken, is often discreetly downplayed behind the scenes. Governments often do this deliberately to defuse any possible expansion of local conflicts.
When Iran’s government drones attacked a U.S. base in Iraq as revenge for the assassination of Iranian General Soleimani in 2020, it expressed that the action was an ‘eye for an eye’ response. Case closed. Likewise, military attacks are more provocative than drone strikes. The hidden language of diplomacy is aided by the work of spies and technology. Knowing this, a country can ratchet back its planning to expand a conflict, or not, based on what it knows about an adversary’s intentions and capabilities.
modern espionage in the digital age
Two young Israeli military technicians/spies betrayed information to Iran about the Israeli Israel Iron Dome missile defense system. They attempted to contact the Iranians through social media. Later, one dropped out once he realized what they were really doing. The other continued; he needed the money his betrayal would bring him. Whereas in earlier days he would have sought out contacts in the secret world through phone calls to embassies, or throwing secrets over a consulate wall, today’s ‘wannabe’ spies reach out online. They use this means to seek out someone in an adversary country. They show they have cleared access and want to sell secrets.
how technology changes intelligence collection
A spy recruiter, once upon a time, would have had to steal then search databases secretly obtained to determine the weakness to be exploited in an adversary’s defensive posture. Nowadays, especially in the United States, databases with huge amounts of private data are stolen or deliberately accessed by culprits for reasons we can only imagine. Why? These information-brokers know data from compromised storage banks can be sold to spy handlers to determine what is real, and what is not.
For instance, if spies can determine a U.S. ship accidentally shot an adversarial aircraft out of the sky, that might be clandestinely dealt with with a less violent response, than if it were a deliberate strike. History provides many examples of how intentions are identified. Espionage, however, can also resolve questions of capabilities. If one nation claims it will unleash vast resources in revenge, a spy can advise whether the threatening nation has such a capability. Likewise, if such a threat is made, and the threatening nation does indeed have such a counterstrike capability, a spy’s information can advise whether they have the intention of taking such an action they are capable of. As we said, determining intentions and capabilities is critical to the secret world. Knowing both is central to effective diplomacy.
This is why the loss of secret information must be identified immediately. Once espionage was a matter which, at best, could help one side understand what was true on the ground. Did the country have such a weapon, and did it work? An adversary could sit at a desk and yell hair-raising threats, yet without a scientist or someone with appropriate expertise to advise, our leadership could not know whether such a threat was feasible. Without an expert’s judgment, a spy could not make a meaningful report about capabilities. Intentions are equally as difficult to determine.
when intelligence shapes global decisions
We in the United States argue constantly over how Ukraine should use the weaponry we provide. Once Vladimir Putin made threats to use nuclear weapons if his declared red lines were crossed, we feared expansion of the war. We didn’t know exactly when, or if, the Russians would make good on their nuclear threat. The threat alone kept further assistance to Ukraine at bay, because we didn’t know Russia’s intentions regarding it’s nuclear capability.
The Soviets genuinely believed the United States was preparing for a preemptive strike in 1983 when our late-summer military exercise in Europe took place in Germany. Knowledge that this was not the case was due to a host of data exchanges which ultimately calmed those fears.
It is up to those of us who protect our classified programs to know what we can and cannot do. It is especially critical to know what our adversary can and cannot do. Without such knowledge, we are lost.
