We who secure classified programs, products, and information face dilemmas. Once the product leaves our control, what happens to it? Once sold, who gets what we sold? By this I mean: what of our capabilities could an adversary use if they got their hands on it? How, or can we control who receives our product?
One Company Questions
One British Columbian company in Canada is in a quandary. The company’s superior infantry weapons have turned up in numerous photos of the Rapid Support Forces, the extremist militia currently active in Sudan. These militia members have been accused of numerous cases of slaughter of civilians. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation launched an investigation. The weapons company involved claims they have no idea how their firearms got to these radicals. Questions surround how their legitimate contracts could have been exploited for illicit displacement after arrival at legitimate purchasers. Or did they never reach the intended destination at all? This is one example.
We have found studies by organizations showing that many American corporations have had their computer chips arrive in Russia, despite stringent sanctions. These chips are used in defensive weapons to shoot down Ukrainian artillery, drones, and missiles. Then these chips are further used in the drones Russia fires continuously into Ukraine. What should companies do?
How Does This Happen?
It is important to contact our Commerce and Defense Departments to determine if any of our products have arrived in places they should not have. We have a host of laws and agencies our military-usable products must go through before they are allowed to be sold overseas. Today, these laws are sometimes circumvented. The laws are not circumvented by American gangsters as a rule, but by fake front companies. It costs virtually nothing to register a company in most countries worldwide. After several of our U.S.-made chips were found in destroyed Russian weapon systems, we reviewed the situation. It turns out that many of the companies that purchased the weaponized chips were in nations with little or no use for them. It is believed these chips were then sold to Russia. These were often front companies. What is to be done?
If you become aware of such misappropriation of the goods you manufacture, treat it just as you would espionage. Advise your local FBI support office, or another U.S. investigative support team. Tracking your equipment is not easy. That will involve reviewing documentation, locations around the world, and open-source assessments. This latter can confirm whether some of your equipment has materialized where it should not. A good example is the one above. The British Columbia company’s logo was found clearly marked in random photos collated during an open-source collection sponsored by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. But there it was, the logo easily visible on weapons held by revolutionaries in Sudan. Are your end products in the same situation?
Due DILIGENCE
Check with U.S. Government officials, who can advise you on how to determine whether your product is being misused. Once you determine that, you can follow up to find out whether your supply chain has been interdicted, compromised, or otherwise changed. This will likely require immediate contact with your government investigative staff.
Your company shouldn’t conduct such investigative actions itself. Not only are you not trained to pursue illegal weapons misappropriation, but your actions might also compromise ongoing investigations. Too often, good intent mixes with official channels and causes a case to be discredited.
This is where common sense comes in. In one case, a European country had its weapons-grade chips sold routinely to Russia. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these sales were sanctioned. Then a ‘miraculous’ appearance occurred. A Central Asian nation became the purchaser of such chips. This country had no use for them, and common sense would have asked why it wanted them. No one asked the question until opened, unexploded capsules on otherwise destroyed Russian drones displayed their origin in the producing European country. Intercepting this secret trail required a response.
Know the recipients of your products. Follow the trail to the end user if possible. If you have any doubts, report these concerns to your investigative supporters. Remember, your awareness of world events is your best defense against passing your equipment to the wrong parties. Only you can prevent such disasters, and all you need to do is report it, just as you would with espionage. Be alert. Take action.
