In the murky realm of espionage, a recent Bellingcat study, in collaboration with Germany’s Der Spiegel and Italy’s La Repubblica, exposes a relentless Russian campaign. They’re not just sticking to old-school spy games; their repertoire includes computer warfare, terrorism, election manipulation, and more. It’s a multifaceted assault on Western adversaries, and today, we’re delving into one of their covert tactics.
Espionage’s Evolution: From Sleeper Agents to Anna Chapman and Maria K.
Security Managers remember 2010 as the year of the Russian ‘sleeper’ agents. In that year some 10 Russian agents, disguised as ‘average Americans’ were exposed. They were revealed as having been secretly infiltrated into our society by the Putin government. Most intriguing about that case was how the spies’ ‘backstory’, the tales they told to account for their previous lives, were so painstakingly validated. The Russian hope was that they would evolve into significant players in American hierarchies. Someday, they might be able to betray our government, our intelligence services, our industries from within. Let’s remember that the Russians idolize ‘the great illegals’. These were their spies inserted in American and British governments after their early years of training in the 1930s. Incredibly, Russian postage stamps honored these espionage agents.
Spies of yesteryear like Kim Philby and Arnold Deutsch must now give way to Anna Chapman, and Maria Adela K. These young women were given backgrounds, training, and sent abroad to enter American and European societies, there to cultivate sources for their Russian masters.
We discover that Anna Chapman claimed to be active in ‘gun rights’. This, and an attractive personality, garnered her access to American conservative social groups. Maria K., for her part, was the talk of the town among NATO officers whom she met while active in the Lion’s Club in Naples, Italy, outside its massive Naval Base. Both of them were ultimately identified, but were dealt with quite differently. Chapman was deported, exchanged for spies held by the Russians. Maria K. disappeared, only to be found later under her actual Russian name, safe in Russia, her mission accomplished. What exactly that mission was, we can never be sure. What we can presume is that she was sent to identify those with exploitable weaknesses. Having identified these, she reported them to her handler. He or she in turn could pass off the mission to others for possible recruitment of such vulnerable people. Could there be such activities going on with people responsible for your cleared programs?
Securing Cleared Programs: Ensuring Trustworthiness Amid Espionage
Verify what you know about your employees. Be certain that their clearances are valid, and that they are properly passed when they travel. Likewise, there can be no exceptions when you have cleared visitors to your facility. Make sure their clearances are passed through SCI channels. Also, bring-up investigations cannot be delayed. Nor should they be considered ‘ho-hum’ tedium to get done so the person can get back to work. No. These may be some of the only chances you have to make sure the person working for you is who he says he is. And then there are social clubs.
Evaluating Risk: Could Your Employees Be Compromised?
We all encourage our people to have a life beyond work. Relaxation and mental stimulation are critical to doing a good job. What we need to be sure of is that they aren’t being evaluated for possible compromise. Who do they meet? Do you have a means for them to report ‘unusual events? What if your employees, not necessarily only your cleared personnel, feel something unusual happened? Do they know who to go to? What to look for?
Staying Ahead of Modern Threats
It was determined that Maria K. traveled extensively. She even went abroad for a jewelry conference in Bahrain, which is also one of our US Naval Bases. What did she do there? Can we assume she departed with the names of contacts provided by her military associates at the ever-welcoming Naples Lion’s Club? Of course, we’ll never know. I hope the Navy is looking, however. You see, Maria K. ‘disappeared’, only reporting she was diagnosed with cancer. Maria K. seems to lie quite easily.
In short, security managers for cleared programs must think like the adversary. If you don’t keep current with espionage and subversive activities around the world, you’ll be taken by surprise. When? When you can least handle a revelation of espionage, when it is too late and your whole program is compromised. Someone should have reviewed Ms. Chapman’s background as she wended her way into more and higher official contacts. What on earth, someone might have wondered, was a Russian ‘weapons enthusiast’ in the first place? It didn’t even require actual access to classified for Maria K. to compromise those who do have it. Take the time to review your team’s activities. Take the time now, because tomorrow may be too late.
