Parents generally try to give advice that is meant to help their children avoid making mistakes that could ruin a career or possibly result in criminal prosecution. Of course, there are exceptions.
Such was the case of U.S. Navy Machinist Mat Jinchao Wei, aka Patrick Wei, who is now facing life in prison after he allegedly revealed sensitive information on U.S. Navy ships. Wei has been accused of providing as many as 50 manuals containing technical and mechanical data about various ships as well as details about the number and training of Marines during an upcoming exercise to the Chinese government.
Instead of being dissuaded by his mother, Wei – who is just 22 years old – was actively encouraged, as she suggested it could help him land a job with the Chinese government in the future.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Fred Sheppard made the accusation at a hearing in federal court in San Diego on Tuesday that Wei was pressured by his mother to cooperate with a Chinese intelligence officer. Sheppard also urged the judge not to release Jinchao Wei, who was arrested last week on a rarely used espionage charge.
Wei Shared Classified Secrets
As previously reported, Wei provided a Chinese intelligence officer with U.S. Navy information, much of which was related to the USS Essex (LHD-2), a Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault ship that is homeported in San Diego. The vessel was launched in February 1991 and commissioned on October 17, 1992, while moored at Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island.
Wei was actually one of two U.S. citizens who were indicted on a variety of felony charges by a grand jury for their role in the pilfering of sensitive U.S. Navy documents and information which put the OPSEC of U.S. forces at risk.
The other individual charged was Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, aka Thomas Zhao of the U.S. Navy, who had opted to exchange sensitive information with a Chinese intelligence officer via a variety of means, including, video recording, photos of sensitive information, documents, information on U.S. radar at U.S. military base in Okinawa, and OPSEC information on U.S. military exercises in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Zhao reportedly received over the course of two years $14,866, while Wei – who handed over 30 restricted naval manuals over the course of 18 months, was given somewhere between $5,000 and $15,000.
Very Bad Advice From His Mother
The United States Justice Department charged Wei under an Espionage Act statute that makes it a crime to gather or deliver information to aid a foreign government. The Chinese-born Wei was apparently first approached by the Chinese intelligence officer in February 2022 while the sailor was still applying to become a naturalized U.S. citizen.
Wei went home to Wisconsin for Christmas that same year, and his mother was already aware of the situation. However, she encouraged him to keep helping the Chinese officer, as she believed it might help him get a job with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after he left the U.S. Navy.
Reporting Such Encouragement?
In this case, Wei had apparently already been engaged with the Chinese intelligence officer when his mother had offered her encouragement. Typically family members are checked during a background investigation, but a question could be asked what someone should do if a loved one or friend actively encouraged the person to reveal classified materials?
“Immediate family members are checked for intelligence database hits and FBI criminal records, however that is the limit of inquiry in most security clearance background investigations,” explained ClearanceJobs legal correspondent Sean Bigley. “Further digging only happens if the government has specific reason to do so – for example, the applicant admits to family member foreign government ties on their SF-86. But even then, there are limits to how far the investigation can be expanded as a background check before it morphs into a counter-intelligence investigation.”
For the sake of national security, Bigley suggested that there is the hope that alleged espionage would be caught during any background investigation, but said the reality is that the process is over-reliant on applicant self-admissions and government databases.
“Without seeing the defendant’s SF-86 and background investigation file, it is difficult to know if something was missed that should have been caught within the established contours of the background investigation process,” Bigley continued. “Clearly at some point suspicions were raised, so in that sense the system did work – albeit perhaps a bit later than the government would have liked.”
In case of reporting a family member, that could best be described as largely uncharted waters!
“This was an awful situation for the sailor, if true. There is no easy answer as to what to do when your own mother is encouraging this course of action,” admitted Bradley Moss, security clearance attorney and partner in the Law Office of Mark S. Zaid.
“The sailor certainly could have sought assistance from his security officer, but it appears from the criminal allegations that the sailor was already coordinating with the Chinese intelligence officer anyway so that would be a non-starter,” Moss told ClearanceJobs. “The sad reality is that these facts if proven will only further increase the ‘split loyalty’ anxiety U.S. security officials have with respect to recently naturalized U.S. citizens and their families.”
