Over the course of two days we saw Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure both exploited and the devices used turned into kinetic weapons. While much has been posited as to what and how, there is still much to be learned on how the operation, presumed to have been carried out by Israel, came about.
Hezbollah is a known terrorist organization and resides on the State Department’s listing of such organizations. The organization is actively supported by Iran. The Hezbollah-Israeli engagement has seen an uptick following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. This uptick has caused approximately 60,000 Israeli residents along the border with Lebanon to relocate. Earlier in September, the government of Israel announced their desire to return the residents to their homes.
First came the pagers
On September 17 at approximately 3:30 PM in Lebanon pagers used by Hezbollah began to “beep” and then explode. Media reports that thousands were wounded and some died. The pagers were part of the emergency communications network used by Hezbollah which had been activated following an internal directive to stop using cell phones, a primary form of intra-Hezbollah communication. Among those wounded was the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon when his Hezbollah issued pager exploded.
Early speculation was that it was a hack which caused the lithium battery to overheat and explode. As time passed, and the train of additional information arrived, reports stated the Hezbollah pagers had been physically altered and that a board which contained explosive material had been inserted and was ignited by the pager-battery when a command was received via an inbound message.
Then the radios, cell phones, laptops and other electronics
Then on September 18, reports of hand-held radios (walkie-talkies) also used by Hezbollah were also exploding. Additional reports included cell phones, laptops and other electronics using batteries were exploding at the hands of Hezbollah members.
The government in Israel isn’t saying they conducted the operation, yet they are intimating that they did with casual phraseology such as “lightning does strike twice in the same spot.”
To conduct an operation of this magnitude and precision requires planning, inside information, and a good deal of luck. From this long-in-the-tooth former intelligence officer, this operation was well thought out, well executed and has wide ranging effects, not only for Hezbollah, for all engaged in a conflict.
Multiple media organizations are reporting the operation was indeed conducted by Israel and that the intelligence and security organizations of Israel were organizing this operation over the course of the past few years.
The AR 924 pagers were acquired apparently from a company doing business in Hungary under license from a Taiwanese company. France 24 reports that Gold Apollo acknowledged the brand yet notes that these were manufactured by BAC Consulting KFT, based in the Hungarian capital of Budapest. The Taiwanese company was very clear they had little to do with the assembly of the devices, “according to the cooperation agreement, we authorized BAC to use our brand trademark for product sales and detonated reasons, but the design and manufacture of the products are solely responsible of BAC.”
The Guardian reports that the pagers had a small board carrying explosives inserted into the device and connected to the battery. This was accomplished, not when the shipment was enroute to Lebanon, rather on the manufacturing floor. Guardian was unable to locate the manufacturer’s facility, beyond their registered mailing addressed, which was also used by multiple companies (perhaps the registered agent for these companies, not uncommon).
The New York Times reports that BAC is a shell company, and additional shell companies were used in the orchestration and compromise of the Hezbollah supply chain. It is probable, yet has not been confirmed, that BAC was a cover company designed to provide communication services to those who need secure communications done in a low-profile way with the utmost discretion. Exactly the type of service Hezbollah needed. The organization submits their order, be it direct or through a reseller (middleman) and a supply chain controlled by Israel is in business.
Do we have to worry about our devices?
Your electronic devices connected to a communications network are vulnerable and have been since day one. Could your device be manipulated and a battery with explosives inserted to cause you physical damage, as we’re seeing with Hezbollah? The answer is always “yes, it is possible, yet highly improbable.”
Hezbollah has a serious counterintelligence problem
Hezbollah has got a serious counterintelligence problem. The organization is known for their excellent counterintelligence work, not only in Lebanon. Their CI personnel are well trained, methodical and good at ferreting out their counterintelligence threats. They missed this one. They missed it in a big way.
The command-and-control communications of Hezbollah has been compromised. Now all logistics used by Hezbollah are being called into question. The leadership of the organization has successfully been targeted, the self-doubt and confusion as to how this occurred is no doubt present.
The world’s intelligence and security services, once they get over the awe of the operation, will no doubt be reviewing their own procurement and supply chain, and insider programs to determine vulnerability to a similar act by an adversary nation.
