There have been a number of articles published online about “Yankee White” (YW) clearances. Most state or imply that YW is a special clearance procedure for White House personnel, whose work brings them in close proximity to the President or Vice President of the United States. Some articles state that it is a Special Access Program (SAP). Many of these articles also suggest that the investigation for a YW clearance is conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and is more involved than a traditional full field investigation like a Tier 5 background investigation for a Top Secret clearance.
YW is strictly a Department of Defense (DoD) program for determining the suitability of DoD personnel to be assigned to Presidential Support Duties (PSD). YW is not a Special Access Program. YW investigations are not conducted by the FBI. YW does not apply to White House staff. White House staff are processed for security clearances by the Personnel Security Office of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), based on investigations conducted by the FBI. YW does not apply to journalists who are issued passes to attend press briefings and cover news worthy events at the White House. These passes are issued based on favorable background checks by the U.S. Secret Service.
DoD personnel assigned to PSD are divided into 3 categories. Category One and Category Two personnel must have a Tier 5 investigation (required for critical sensitive national security positions) favorably completed within 36 months preceding selection for PSD. Additionally, Category One personnel must submit a tax information waiver form. Category Three personnel must have a Tier 3 investigation (required for non-critical sensitive national security positions) favorably completed within the last 36 months. Personnel in all categories must also submit a Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form 450). The Tier 5 and Tier 3 investigations for PSD positions are otherwise standard investigations conducted by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). DCSA also makes the national security eligibility determinations for these cases, but does not make the YW eligibility determinations. The Executive Secretary (ExecSec) of the Department of Defense (DoD) is final authority for approving almost all PSD nominees. Most DoD personnel assigned to PSD do not have close or direct access to the President or the White House. These positions include the hundreds of Boeing personnel in San Antonio, TX working on presidential aircraft and maintenance personnel assigned to Marine Helicopter Squadron One, MCB Quantico, VA.
DoD Presidential Support Activities (PSA) initiate the nomination process by reviewing a potential nominee’s locally available personnel, base, military police, medical, and security records, as well as conducting a security interview of the nominee. If the nominee has not recently had a favorably completed background investigation required for the position, they also review the nominee’s Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86) before submitting a request for the appropriate investigation. If the interview and record reviews are all favorable, the PSA forwards a nomination packet to the DoD Component’s YW “Component Office.” When the Component Office has received a favorable national security determination from DCSA, it can disapprove or recommend approval of the nominee. If the Component Office recommends approval of the nominee, the nomination package is forwarded to the DoD ExecSec for final approval. For nominees that require a White House pass or access to the White House complex, the ExecSec forwards the nomination packet to the Director of the White House Military Office or the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs for a final determination.
DoD Instruction 5210.87, “Selection of DoD Military and Civilian Personnel and Contractor
Employees for Assignment to Presidential Support Activities (PSAs),” includes provisions for appealing non-selection for PSD, but these appeal procedures are only available to DoD civilians and contractor personnel, not to military personnel. In many ways eligibility for PSD is similar to eligibility for the DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Both are employment suitability determinations for individuals, who have already been determined eligible for sensitive national security positions, using additional eligibility criteria. Both also have requirements for pre-nomination interviews and local records checks and post-selection continuous evaluation. Neither have any qualification standards for personnel who adjudicate YW or PRP eligibility. Unlike other security regulations, neither are based on an Executive Order, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), or Public Law. However, the PRP is linked to the DoE Human Reliability Program (10 CFR 712) by a memorandum of understanding between DoD and DoE.
DoD Directive 5210.55, “Department of Defense Presidential Support Program,” December 1998, cancelled and replaced the original July 1977 version of DoD Directive 5210.55, titled: “Selection of DoD Military and Civilian Personnel and Contractor Employees for Assignment to Presidential Support Activities.” Much of the older version of the directive was incorporated into the December 1998 DoD Instruction 5210.87. Neither the directive nor the instruction have been updated since 1998.
Given the many changes to the DoD personnel security program over the past 25 years, reevaluation of the need for the YW program may be overdue. Creating, processing and approving YW nomination packages adds considerable time to placing a person in a PSD position. There are no provisions for interim YW eligibility, so nomination packages cannot be forwarded for approval until a background investigation has been completed and a final favorable national security eligibility determination has been made. For example, delays in clearing Boeing personnel for PSD has contributed to the delays in delivering the new Air Force One aircraft. It’s doubtful any of these Boeing workers will ever be in close proximity to the President. Non-DoD personnel who work at the White House are not subject to YW or any similar process. Journalist are allowed to attend events at the White House that bring them very close to the President, yet the only suitability criterion for denial of a White House press pass is that the journalist “presents a potential source of physical danger to the President and/or to the family of the President so serious as to warrant the denial of the clearance.” By comparison there are two pages of YW eligibility criteria in DoD Instruction 5210.87. This is in addition to the eligibility criteria contained in the 20 pages of the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, which is used to grant the YW nominee national security eligibility.
Prior to a July 1976 federal court decision in Forcade v. Knight (416 F.Supp. 1025, D.D.C. (1976)) there were no publicized standards for denying a White House press pass nor was there any due process for those denied a press pass. In Forcade the US District Court ruled that the USSS must:
devise and publicize narrow and specific standards for the issuance or denial of press pass applications, to consider plaintiffs’ applications within the context of the newly devised standards, and to render a written decision specifying the grounds for denial, if that be the decision, after affording plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to rebut or explain any evidence or grounds upon which the agency bases its denial.
This ruling was upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (569 F.2d 124, D.C. Cir. 1977) in December 1977, and the USSS standard and procedures were later codified at Title 31 CFR Part 409. Coincidentally, the DoD YW program was created in July 1977, when the original DoDD 5210.55 was issued. The timing of these events suggests a connection between the creation of the YW program in 1977 and the court cases involving the denial of White House press passes in July 1976 and December 1977; however, there’s no documented or direct evidence of a connection.
Today, almost all DoD applicants for sensitive national security positions are considered for an Interim or Temporary eligibility determination. As part of that determination there must be a favorable review of locally available personnel, base, military police, medical, and security records—the same as required for PSD. All DoD personnel occupying sensitive national security positions are also enrolled in Continuous Evaluation. So, aside from the screening interview, financial disclosures, and tax release, the only difference between national security eligibility and YW eligibility is the additional YW adjudicative criteria at Enclosure 4 to DoD Instruction 5210.87. These limited extra requirements seem superfluous since the advent of Continuous Vetting and the requirements for Insider Threat Programs. White House personnel granted security clearances by the EOP aren’t subject to any secondary suitability vetting. White House press passes can be issued to foreign and domestic journalists, including independent journalists, podcasters, and social media influencers, based on a USSS investigation somewhat equivalent to a Tier 5 investigation and a determination that the journalist does not present “a potential source of physical danger to the President and/or to the family of the President so serious as to warrant the denial of the clearance.”
Is the additional time required to determine whether a person, who already has a security clearance, is eligible to perform PSD, worth the limited additional security afforded by the process? Could the YW program be eliminated or could it be simplified and accomplished at DCSA?
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