A Chinese national has been federally charged with unlawfully photographing a vital U.S. military installation after two days of suspicious activity near Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The Department of Justice announced the case on January 7, against Qilin Wu for capturing images and videos of the base’s B-2 Spirit stealth bomber fleet and perimeter security features.
Whiteman AFB Incident
Air Force security personnel spotted Qilin Wu’s out-of-state minivan lingering near the Whiteman AFB perimeter on December 2, 2025. Wu admitted he was there to observe the B-2 aircraft, received a warning, and left.
The vehicle returned the next day. Security found about 18 photos and videos on his device depicting the B-2, fencing, gates, and equipment taken from public areas outside the perimeter, including sensitive areas near the Weapons Storage Area and entry control points.
Whiteman AFB hosts the nation’s entire operational B-2 fleet, strategic assets recently deployed in operations against Iran and, most recently, Venezuela.
About Wu
Wu, a Chinese citizen illegally entered the United States in 2023 near Nogales, AZ, after traveling from China through Ecuador and Mexico. He was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection but released pending immigration proceedings (scheduled for February 2027).
He holds a duly issued Massachusetts driver’s license and Chinese passport. Wu described himself as an aviation enthusiast, with the “B-2 as his favorite aircraft” followed by the F-35. He admitted to previously photographing military aircraft at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, including an A-10, B-2, and B-52.
He also disclosed during his consensual interview his prior service in the Chinese military, including as a firefighter and a two-year stint as a saxophone player in the Central Military Band of the People’s Liberation Army. From this writer’s optic, it may be true or not, it is certainly benign.
During a consensual search of his vehicle, agents found bedding, food, and drinks, indicating it was equipped for extended travel. Wu stated his intent was to observe the B-2, then travel to Florida to view an F-35, and subsequently to “Houston Star Base” (likely referring to Space Center Houston or a related space facility).
A criminal background check revealed prior law enforcement interactions in Key West, FL: On May 7, 2024, Key West Police Department officers encountered Wu camping in his van at 55 Quay Road, documenting it as suspicious. On May 14, 2024, he received a written warning for lodging in the vehicle at 3681 South Roosevelt Boulevard, directly in NAS Key West’s aircraft flight path.
Wu was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 795 for photographing a defense installation. His immigration proceedings were transferred from Massachusetts to Kansas City for a custody redetermination hearing.
China’s Persistent Pattern of Probing U.S. Military Installations
This incident fits a well-documented, multi-year pattern of Chinese nationals attempting unauthorized visual surveillance of U.S. bases, often using low-risk methods like photography from adjacent areas or, increasingly, drones. These efforts persist despite repeated interruptions by vigilant security forces:
- Qilin Wu’s activities:
- Whiteman Air Force Base, MO (December 2025): Qilin Wu photographed B-2 stealth bombers and perimeter features after repeated visits.
- Langley Air Force Base, VA (prior to 2025): Wu admitted photographing multiple military aircraft, including an A-10, B-2, and B-52.
- NAS Key West, FL (May 2024): Wu was encountered twice by Key West Police while camping in his van near sensitive aviation areas; received a written warning for lodging in the vehicle.
- NAS Oceana, VA (2019): Chinese diplomats drove past checkpoints onto a special operations base, claiming language barriers; they were expelled.
- Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI (2018–2023): At least 14 incidents involving Chinese nationals using drones and cameras for unauthorized surveillance.
- Fort Wainwright, Alaska (2023): Individuals bypassed a checkpoint with a drone in their vehicle, claiming to be lost tourists; escorted off without escalation.
- Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms, CA (2024): A military-aged Chinese male trespassed without identification and refused orders; detained and transferred to Border Patrol.
- Newport News Shipbuilding Area, VA (2024): A drone captured images of nuclear carriers and submarines under construction; operator convicted under the Espionage Act.
- Vandenberg Space Force Base, CA (2024): Separate drone incidents, including one during a sensitive launch, led to arrests and sentences.
- Naval Weapons Station Earle, NJ (2024): Multiple large unidentified drones entered restricted airspace; ongoing detection and monitoring.
These examples illustrate how China is using a repeatable playbook: external access, plausible deniability, and persistence to use citizen collectors to acquire low level intelligence concerning U.S. military assets and facilities.
Counterintelligence and Community Awareness
Counterintelligence and community awareness briefings should continue prioritizing and reinforcing the “See Something, Say Something” principle. These briefings should include:
♦ Recognizing Anomalies
Lingering vehicles, repeat visitors, or unusual aerial activity near perimeters.
♦ Prompt Reporting
Empowering all observers, from gate guards to local residents, to alert authorities without hesitation.
♦ Layered Responses
Combining human vigilance with detection systems to ensure quick intervention.
♦ Community Partnerships
Engaging nearby civilians through DHS campaigns to extend the security perimeter informally.
By embracing and promoting “See Something, Say Something,” we turn potential vulnerabilities into strengths.
