The “Little Green Men,” the nickname given to Russian soldiers and mercenaries deployed to the Crimea at the start of the Ukraine-Russia war, have arrived in the Baltic nation of Estonia. They wore green uniforms without identification in order to allow deniability. In time, they were acknowledged as Special Forces sent to “protect” Russian nationals. In fact, they came to overtake key Ukrainian installations and the airport in Crimea.
Lessons from The World Wars
We need to be aware of these tactics if we are to defend our classified programs. We can’t rely simply on countermeasures to known threats. Our preparations will be for nothing if we plan only for the past. Consider: The Maginot Line in France was built in the 1920s and 30s to defend against another massive German infantry assault, as happened in World War I (1914-1918). The Belgians, not to be outdone, built Fort Eben Emael to extend the French defensive Maginot line. After all, they reasoned, the Germans had simply gone through Belgium and thus around previous French defenses in the First World War. Not this time.
Instead, what the Germans did in World War II astounded the world. They employed a wholly new concept, airborne soldiers. They landed on top of Fort Eban Emael from glider aircraft. The soldiers dropped from gliders and landed from parachutes, having passed over the emplaced machine guns and artillery of the fort. These wholly unexpected parachutists, dropped directly onto the fortress, conquered the multi-million-franc investment in a day. Strategically, the airborne assault overcame another impediment to the German advance. The gliders flew over the Netherlands to reach the Belgian fort. Thus Dutch neutrality was overcome as a factor by the Germans.
Gathering Data Worldwide
We’ve discussed the vast amount of threat data available to our programs. These sources are from both government and private corporations. We seldom, however, seek information abroad. Why is that? Often, we simply aren’t aware that our foreign colleagues have a vast storehouse of information, not to mention academia. Consider Vox-pol, a university program developed to studyonline extremism and terrorism through academic research. Vox-pol was developed as a product of Swansea University in the United Kingdom. They have been significant in researching, discussing, and sharing information about the types of online threats that afflict the world today. For instance, they learn what terrorists do in recruitment, in planning, and execution. From national threats to those emanating from clandestine organizations and terrorist groupings. Vox-pol has solicited research from a vast array of scholars, practitioners, and even private individuals. Together these documents are collated, then published in a monthly update. Further, they have conferences that are open to wholly new ideas and the examination of current theories. In all cases, they can then better their analysis and offer it to a world in fear and concern. None of this comes without cost.
Impact of Extremism Research
Researchers studying extremism have been met with significant threats themselves. Thus, their ability to pursue career paths might be impeded, or perhaps they might even have threats made against them. One academic noted he was threatened via the site 4Chan. In several cases, research is no longer simply found in a ‘pleasant garden’ of academia, since so many people desire access to their research. For this reason, material published through sites such as Vox-pol will advise that their information “is offered free of charge for personal and non-commercial use, provided the source is acknowledged. For commercial or any other use, prior written permission must be obtained from VOX-Pol. In no case may this material be altered, sold or rented.” Thus, academia’s standards are maintained, while careful attention must be applied by practitioners who avail themselves of the material.
Attendance at these academic conferences is valuable, and can offer contacts throughout the research world. In keeping pace with the various extremist organizations, so much has to be considered. How contacts are made and information shared is critical in understanding these academic research papers. These are not documents protected by classified access, nor by institutional limitations for the most part. Indeed, information about many extremist organizations is derived from the terrorist organizations themselves. Such groups write extensively about their aims, goals, and targets. It is up to us, who are defending our classified programs, to know how best to reach out for information about threats to our plans and programs, while still keeping our sources safe.
