Watching “Oppenheimer,” we come to a scene where he greets his British colleague. Klaus Fuchs came from England to work on the Manhattan Project, the first atomic bomb. Of course, Klaus Fuchs was not British but a German refugee who’d left to escape Hitler-inspired persecution. He found employment with the British Government in atomic physics and became one of the primary researchers at the new American test site in New Mexico.
What we don’t see is how Klaus Fuchs, revealed later in the film to be a Soviet spy, relayed his information back to Moscow. He was part of a then-standard Soviet spy network. This means he passed his stolen information to a middleman (in his case, Harry Gold, who carried copies of the purloined documents), who in turn carried it cross-country and passed it secretly to the Soviets. Fuchs was identified through an FBI electric communications intercept; Fuchs was linked to Gold who was linked to even more spies in the net.
Espionage Truism
Times and methods change. In time, an espionage truism came to be. This was that the weakest link for any espionage operation is the communication method for passing the espionage material itself. If one spy was captured, it meant the whole chain could be “rolled up” because all spies would betray others they knew to be part of their network. Espionage planners thought they’d overcome this weakness of a spy network in two ways. They cut out the middleman carrying information by providing their source with a burst transmitter, which shot information electronically over the airwaves. This meant they were more susceptible to electronic intercept, however. Secondly, using the burst transmitter, they could recruit agents who were not aware of anyone else in the chain. If one was caught, he could betray no one else.
Computer specialists would add even a newer dimension. Malware, inserted in the adversary’s computer systems, could literally suck the information dry. Indeed, the computer spies could insert a trojan horse, waiting for the precise moment to break the whole system, say in preparation for a war. We heard recently from the FBI Director about such threats.
So many counterintelligence agencies thought the day of the chain of material exchanging hands was at an end. Not at all. Today, it still exists, but in a very new manner. Consider some recent cases.
Spying In Today’s World
The German government detained a German/Russian dual citizen. He owned a company in Germany that imported electronic items necessary for drone weaponry, all of which were banned for sale to Russia. He’d take his properly-imported material, repackage it, and send it to two dummy corporations in Russia, where it was to be used in their modern high-tech weaponry. Now, instead of transmitting documents by courier as in Fuchs’s day, whole components are transmitted in ways to break EU and other sanctions mandates. Sort of espionage by delivery.
Then there is another variation on the old spy network. A particularly successful Chinese method was employed against Taiwan. A businessman from Hong Kong with frequent trips to the island would greet his military officer counterparts in the Taiwanese military. He offered fantastic trips abroad, and wonderful gifts as inducements for their spouses to ask for more. In return, they would provide line and block charts from memory, or defense planning concepts. Or, they would even provide – most rewarding for the spy master – further contacts of those willing to “share thoughts.” Again, there was no spy net chain as such. Rather, the officers would travel abroad to meet the traveling businessman. As such, one never knew of the other, and if compromised could not betray others similarly recruited. Indeed, rather than delivering material, the theft was largely what the officers carried in their head. Of particular note, recruited sources included a retired admiral and even a retired air force colonel and six colleagues.
Addressing Spy Tactics
As cleared managers, what can we do? Who can reach into the mind of others, now that “rolling up whole nets” seems less likely today? One method would be to confirm the actual route your products will take upon completion, then delivery. You can initially go to your supporting military or civilian investigative teams for guidance on cleared and sensitive deliveries. Of course, you should always be aware of dual-use materials you deliver, too. Your intelligence advisors can refer you to appropriate Homeland Security, Customs, or Commerce colleagues. These can delve into the final destination of your products, to insure they get where you want them to go, not get sidetracked to bogus front companies.
Note too that you are reading about approaches to retired military and civilian sources for spies. This is a little considered field by most. An official, long engaged in senior management, finally retires. After a period of time, he longs for the intellectual challenges of his or her working years. He longs to round out his life in further “work worth doing.” Along comes a friendly, harmless face, offering lucrative benefits, travel, money, or gifts, for him and his spouse. Meetings never happen in an office, rather in exquisite clubs in exotic places. There, ever so slowly, the hooks are set, and the questions are presented. Never, however, is there anything so gauche as to appear a form of espionage is taking place. Rather, the questions charm with their appreciation of his known abilities, insights, indeed wisdom. Flattery. The elicitation is completed when an agreed method of exchange happens, and ‘by the way, who else of your former colleagues would be interested in such business as we discussed today?’
Stay In Contact With Retired Colleagues
This means it is important to recontact your former colleagues, now retired. Consult with your FBI associates. They can perhaps arrange to have your colleagues invited to a meet and greet to discuss such matters. The FBI is well positioned to help alert such a clientele of former specialists to potential threats after retirement.
Just like the spies who deliver whole components to an adversary, so the recruitment of new spies shows more sinister methods than the older spy nets. Their goals are the same as then, but our counterintelligence awareness of their chameleon-like methods should try to keep one step ahead.
