Protection against adversarial threats demands endless awareness. Most concerns we see today focus on how we respond to those threats. If such a danger is identified, how will the targeted organization respond? Our companies and organizations are located all over the world. Nowhere are they safe from unusual, often never-before-tried attempts to compromise our defenses. Consider numerous cases that have developed over recent years in Europe, a consequence of the war in Ukraine, which have resonance in the United States’ countermeasures.
War Seeks Outside Adversaries
The British identified a Russian trawler, a known collector of electronic intelligence and mapper of underwater cables. The trawler was too near their shores, so the UK responded with a military vessel that came within a football field’s length of the Russian trawler. Likewise, the UK’s Foreign Minister said to his Russian counterpart, “We see you.” So the threat diminished as the Russian vessel pulled away. Likewise, off the shores of Hawaii. There, too, a Russian surveillance ship combed within short distances of our shoreline. There, too, the ship was met with awareness by our seagoing protectors. It is now suspected that such trawlers may carry drones.
From grand plans to lesser schemes, our adversaries have used any number of new plots and tactics to determine how far they could go. Russian drones along the Ukraine border that violated the airspace of NATO Allies Romania and Poland were shot down. In fact, one Russian drone landed in Poland after being destroyed over Ukraine. People wandering through vast forests are believed to be Russian spies. We now know a young man was tasked to collect electronic data outside facilities in the Netherlands for Russia. The list goes on.
Threat Collection
Where collection is the threat, a liaison with local intelligence is required. Yet what if the threat is sabotage? Whole European ammunition dumps and trains that support Ukraine have become targets for destruction by Russia. What would we do if our equipment was located in such a targeted area? Are we connected with the local fire departments? Further, what if our protected materials involve hazardous combustibles? Are we prepared to protect this? Whole studies have shown how Russia targets the entire system of supply lines helping Ukraine. Where do we fit in?
What about espionage? Across Europe, spies are active, so why should they not be here in the United States? The same nation that doesn’t hesitate to conduct massive training drills that force deployment of NATO aircraft in response would hardly falter in stealing information from farther-away adversaries instead. Who are your employees? A Latvian in his own country was arrested on charges similar to Bulgarians in the UK on espionage charges; why not where you live? Or ask yourself why someone would want to know where your equipment is. A NATO intern was arrested for just such inquiries out of her land ‘for a third country.’ Spying alone? To know for some future action, or something more sinister? Several men were convicted for having burned a warehouse in London, ordered by Russians. We can’t see the overall plan to these Russian plots in Europe. So we who protect our assets need to see where they are active, and what could come as a result of their actions. Unlike Cold War concerns, present espionage has a direct connection to action. Whereas a spy in 1979 stole information against a war that could come, spies today collect information that has immediate application.
Employ Security
Which brings us back to our security program. The basic questions we ask ourselves are how do we move, shoot, and communicate. New dangers affect every element of accomplishing our missions. ‘Movement’ implies we retain our ability to transfer protected assets, be they documents or equipment, secretly and securely. ‘Shoot’ means we can accomplish our mission. If our job is to develop software deliverable to an ally without compromise, can we do it? ‘Communicate’ is just that. Are our means of communication established and coordinated with all appropriate agencies to accomplish the first two missions? Specifically, are there ways an adversary can intercept our transmissions, ‘read our mail’, or interfere with our means of doing so? This last could take any number of ways to manifest itself. Malware set to go off at a critical time could close down our computers. Interceptions of our transmissions could be active at all times, leaving us sending messages read by the enemy from morning ’til night.
Our job, then, is to constantly assess ‘the battlefield’. It is no longer that of even ten years ago. We must keep current with all threats, as they develop. To do so requires security consciousness like never before. Work with allies and investigative agencies, and read current threat assessments. Your mission, and sometimes your life, depends on it.
