If you read my articles with any consistency, you probably know by now how I feel about the pseudo “science” behind the polygraph. If not, I’ll put it this way: federal agencies continue to rely on – as the great arbiter of security-worthiness – technology that has been deemed by many federal courts and the U.S. Justice Department itself “as prejudicial, misleading, and a waste of time.”[1]
What could possibly go wrong?
Two recent cases we litigated evidence exactly what can go wrong. Both matters involved engineer-scientist types working on contract for a U.S. intelligence agency. In one case, the client purportedly admitted during a polygraph to viewing child pornography. In the other case, the client purportedly admitted during a polygraph to taking home classified information repeatedly.
At first blush, many observers may congratulate the polygraph examiners for their expert interrogation skills in these cases. I can almost hear your thoughts:
“They should be given medals for ferreting out a child predator and a reckless handler of classified information!”
There was only one minor problem with both cases: the admissions were false. Both clients are now back at work after we won their appeals.
The logical question is obviously why anyone would falsely confess to such outrageous activity? Surprisingly, it happens quite often – and not just in third world countries where the admissions are obtained by more “persuasive” means. These were not intentional falsehoods, but rather ones which were directly caused by what a distinguished psychologist we consulted with termed “The Engineer’s Mindset.” The recipe for disaster may sound familiar to many ClearanceJobs readers. It looks something like this:
Ingredients:
- One upstanding but slightly neurotic U.S. citizen. Engineering, computer, or science background preferable.
- Nervous, obsessive, or self-deprecating tendencies.
- An over-active conscience
Directions:
- Place the clearance holder or applicant into a small room and hook him or her up to a contraption supposedly designed to ascertain one’s deepest, darkest secrets.
- Ask a series of outrageously personal, borderline-inappropriate questions on areas like past sexual behavior and undetected violations of the law.
- Become increasingly hostile and angry when the clearance holder/applicant proves to be a normal, decent human being. Insist that the individual is “hiding something”, allude to the fact that the hidden conduct must be something serious “like a rape” (verbatim quote from a prior case), then wait for the individual’s reaction.
The final product of this recipe is, indeed, a false (or at least misconstrued) confession. For example, the case involving purported child pornography was actually an admission of viewing entirely legal pornography. Because the client admitted to feeling discomfort that some of the adult actors were obviously cast for their youthful appearance, that admission was immediately deemed by the polygraph examiner to be an admission of child pornography – not the attempt that it was by the Client to verbally reconcile his actions with his moral compass.
In the case of the information mishandling, the client took home only company proprietary information to work on from his home office, as he was perfectly entitled to do. How do we know he didn’t mishandle classified information? Records confirm that he never actually had access to it! Yet, because of his nervous and obsessive personality, the client inadvertently termed his company’s proprietary information “classified” and the polygraph examiner had a field day.
The Perfectionist’s Problem
The common theme in these and many of our prior cases – and the reason why the issue is termed the “Engineer’s Mindset – is that individuals with an engineering or scientific background are, by nature, perfectionists. The desire to dot every “I” and cross every “T” may be incredibly valuable in, for example, building a bridge, but it doesn’t translate into the security setting where questions are designed to be taken at face value. Answers that should be simple “yes” or “no” responses evolve into complicated rationalization efforts and over-thinking. Ultimately, the appearance is that the examinee is hiding something.
If any of this sounds like you, understand that your best defense is to be honest with security officials about your personality or mental health diagnosis up-front. Obsessive compulsive tendencies, for example, would not generally be considered a security risk and may help prepare security officials to clarify derogatory answers with you before acting on them.
If anything, your OCD or nervous personality may actually be reassuring to the Agency. After all, they can be sure that you’ll never forget to lock the safe!
WARNING: Providing intentionally false or misleading answers during a polygraph examination (or any other phase of the security process) is a crime. This article is intended as newsworthy commentary only and is not intended to assist anyone in circumventing security screening procedures. Nothing herein should not be construed as legal advice. Consult an attorney regarding your specific situation.
[1] See U.S. Attorneys’ Criminal Resource Manual – Section 262: Polygraphs. See also, United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1996) (polygraph results can mislead the jury); United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996) (unilaterally obtained polygraphs examinations are almost never admissible under Rule 403); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (Rule 403 is a proper ground for excluding polygraph results even after Daubert), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (polygraph questions were ambiguous and hence not probative of the central issues in the case), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996).
