Sunday evening on the Arabian Peninsula, Houthi rebels in control of Yemen launched seven missiles at Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government boasted that it intercepted all seven of them, but that debris from one intercept killed an Egyptian national. The Houthis claim all seven hit their targets. There is no evidence that seven warheads reached their targets, but based on available video evidence, mostly from cell phones, the truth lies somewhere between the Saudi and Yemeni claims.

Even if most of the intercepts were successful, it wasn’t a good showing for the Saudi air defenses or the PAC-2 interceptors fired at the incoming missiles. In videos posted online, one missile detonated almost immediately after launch, one quickly reversed course, impacting and detonating near its launcher, and another missed its target.

Older Missile interceptors not really cutting it

The PAC-2, short for Patriot Advanced Capability-2, was first fielded in 1990, and the PAC-2 GEM, for Guidance-Enhanced Missile was first delivered in early 1995, and fielded in 2002. The Patriot system gained fame for supposedly shooting down incoming Iraqi Scud missiles during Operation Desert Shield in 1991, although that claim, too, is disputed.

Saudi Arabia has begun to purchase the more capable PAC-3 interceptors, but they still have a large inventory of PAC-2s on hand. In November 2012, the Department of Defense asked Congress for authority to sell the Saudis “technical services to recertify the functional shelf life of up to 300” of the missiles.

The PAC-2 works by detonating its warhead in the vicinity of the incoming missile, killing it with shrapnel, while the PAC-3 is a “hit-to-kill” interceptor. In one of the videos of the Saudi intercept attempts, the one showing one of the interceptors detonating immediately after launch in a shower of debris, the detonations of two other PAC-2 warheads are clearly visible, but from the angle it’s not clear if they destroyed the incoming warheads, which are not visible.

In another instance, the interceptor clearly detonates too far away from the incoming warhead, which continues on its trajectory and detonates on impact. Even more dramatic is the PAC-2 that zooms back in the direction from which it came.

The need for reliable information about missile Defense

Saudi Arabia has not been particularly forthcoming regarding its missile defenses, even as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 35-year-old “reformer” who prefers to be called MBS, has been on a charm offensive in the United States. MBS is trying to rehabilitate Saudi Arabia’s image; the Kingdom is a stalwart ally of the U.S. in the region, but most people view it as a backward theocracy where women are little more than property and the Koran is law.

With U.S. shale production booming and OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, cutting production to boost prices, Saudi Arabia is not currently the largest oil producer—the U.S. is. MBS knows that as the world continues to wean itself slowly off of crude oil as an energy source, his country will slowly lose its world influence, and its main revenue source.  He’s determined to bring at least a modicum of modernity to his Kingdom to maintain a seat at the table.

Part of that modernity push must include more transparency in military affairs. The royal family has had the decades-long luxury of a monopoly on information, but that is no longer sustainable. Missile defense is too important a topic to be shrouded in mystery and propaganda.

It does no one any good to boast that your military intercepted seven warheads when everyone is armed with a pocket video camera and a mobile internet connection to share the evidence that you’re lying. No one believed “Baghdad Bob,” and it’s growing increasingly hard to believe the official Saudi pronouncements.

The public deserves to know how effective various forms of missile defense are. While the PAC-2 may be an older, outdated missile that isn’t really designed to intercept the kind of Iranian-built missile that the Houthis are launching at Riyadh, understanding its performance is still an important part of the whole picture.

Effective deterrence requires your adversary to believe you have both the means and the motivation to counter an attack. Lying about a defensive capability’s performance does not help that. Deception is always uncovered, and when it is, credibility is lost.

If the Saudis don’t give a full recounting of how their interceptors failed, the Houthis will continue to believe their attacks are effective, and will continue them. No one outside of the Houthis leadership wants that.

Related News

Tom McCuin is a strategic communication consultant and retired Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Public Affairs officer whose career includes serving with the Malaysian Battle Group in Bosnia, two tours in Afghanistan, and three years in the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in the Pentagon. When he’s not devouring political news, he enjoys sailboat racing and umpiring Little League games (except the ones his son plays in) in Alexandria, Va. Follow him on Twitter at @tommccuin