Counterintelligence is perplexing. It is difficult for a non-professional to understand. Admittedly, most of what Americans with clearances know of the secret world comes initially from media. We’ve repeatedly heard that espionage is not like it appears in movies or novels. Even John le Carre said that ultimately, he is an author who was once a spy, not the other way round. His mastery illuminated the moral dilemmas of espionage, but not the practical aspects so necessary to solving cases. So what should every clearance holder appreciate about the mission of counterintelligence?
Counterintelligence: Protecting Classified Projects
The counter-spy is there to detect, deter, and defeat an adversary. This motto sounds too pat, does it not? His or her job is to protect your classified projects, their components, and information. Clues to begin searching for those who want to steal them are hard to come by. Why? Because they generally arise as tips from average clearance holders who suspect something is wrong, or suspect they’ve been approached. These people are the cleared—and often uncleared—targets of hostile espionage approaches. Do your people know what to do if they find themselves in such a situation? The more they do, the easier the leads are to develop, since they will know what to report.
What does an adversary seek in your organization? His ideal is to get to the ‘holy grail’ of information, the very classified which you want to keep from him. He can employ electronic attacks, using phishing or a host of other modern techniques. Not for nothing did Olympic team managers this year tell their members to carry burner phones, for their secure, encrypted data can now possibly be accessed if not. Does your staff know how to be aware of— and report— such technological approaches? Or, with another method, our adversary spy can identify those in your organization who have access to the information, and solicit them to get it for him. They might be approached at conferences, or elicited from during social encounters. Trips abroad are among preferred methods of contact. Recently we’ve seen an increase in scholars being offered trips abroad by organizations that then subtly seek to collect more information than he is authorized to share. This comes either through discussions at seminars or through materials given for coursework.
Australia has notably advised its clearance holders that approaches are even being made through online dating services! While this might seem odd, it has a very profitable antecedent. Intelligence services have long sought out talent which can explain capabilities, even though they aren’t in the discipline or company which they are really after. An electrical engineer in one company might be fully conversant with the technology in another company which won the classified project. After all, their companies might be in competition. An adversarial collector (spy) might simply ask the loser of the contract to explain the product the other, successful, classified project winner is developing. So now we see that espionage is not linear. No. Espionage approaches come generally from the outside in. That is to say, if I can’t recruit someone with direct knowledge, I seek out someone who knows another employee who does. We saw this often when, for instance, the Russians sought a plan for a breakthrough, major artillery piece. They began by patiently recruiting a factory worker, who explained where the secretaries and managers were, who in turn accessed the major documentation. The process took time, but that’s not the end either.
Espionage Part of a Long Game
Patience plays perhaps the main role in espionage, or the planning for a terrorist attack. Our adversaries are not in a rush to hit us, when to wait and collect our secrets is their goal. They want what will do us the worst harm in the long run. Why steal what they can only once, when access to the safe or vault can be had for weeks, months, or even years? For the same reason patience is a master class for the counterintelligence officer, too.
It would be well if a counterintelligence professional would sit down with a manager and explain as best he can what cleared persons can provide to protect their projects. To know what to provide, our cleared employee must know a lot. The threat information he must be aware of, and report on, changes often. Often the approaches of espionage are through technology, but more often they come in ways least expected. You can be approached at a meeting, online, while traveling, or even while presenting somewhere. How this happens continues to vary, and the imagination of our adversaries is as lively as our countermeasures. Let’s try to keep our cleared personnel current. In the end, it is our country which is best served.
