Many people who offer security clearance advice in person or on a weblog or forum are well intentioned, but they often base their advice on their own personal experience as a clearance applicant. Unfortunately, federal security clearance processing does not exist within a single monolithic structure. There are about 20 federal departments and agencies that are authorized to conduct their own background investigations, and there are scores of federal departments and agencies that grant security clearances. They’re all required to adhere to the same Federal Investigative Standards and National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (NSAG), but beyond that there are differences in the speed and the way things are done. The security clearance process for contractor employees is different than it is for federal civilians and military personnel. There are also procedural differences for contractor employees applying for Special Access Programs like Sensitive Compartment Information. Many bloggers incorrectly assume their experience will be the same for applicants with similar backgrounds, regardless of the applicant’s status and what agency is involved.
The recency of the bloggers experience can also make a big difference in the accuracy of the information they are providing. Compared to a couple of years ago, there has been a big change in the way the “Drug Involvement” criterion (Guideline H) of the NSAG is being applied to marijuana use. Two-year-old blog entries regarding marijuana may be grossly inaccurate today. You also need to be cautious when reading about a blogger’s personal clearance experience, if they don’t say when and by whom their clearance was granted or denied. Within the last year, most Intelligence Community (IC) agencies have changed their automatic disqualification policy regarding last use of marijuana from one year to 90 days. The FBI changed their automatic disqualification policy for marijuana use from three years to one year. These are agency-specific employment suitability/fitness policies, but the effect is the same—no job, no clearance. When it is implemented next spring, the new “Personnel Vetting Questionnaire” will only ask about marijuana use within the past 90 days.
Timing matters for policy, but also for international affairs and external factors affecting the needs of the U.S. and the risks. An Afghan immigrant who recently became a U.S. citizen couldn’t understand why he was being denied a security clearance, when many of his Afghan immigrant friends had been granted clearances. He failed to take into account that his friends received their clearances before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021.
Even the same set of facts can result in different clearance decisions. This happens because of differences between adjudicative facilities and individual adjudicators. Every adjudicative facility has its own culture and every adjudicator is somewhat influenced by his/her own set of values. Security issues are often evaluated in the context of the adjudicator’s values and culture of the office where he/she works. In 2005 the DoD Personnel Security Research Center published a report assessing the security clearance vetting process in the federal government. Part of that report included information about the consistency of adjudications (see PERSEREC Management Report 05-5):
. . . 15 senior adjudicators independently adjudicated 13 cases, one for each of the 13 Adjudicative Guidelines. Very difficult cases were selected in order to maximize the chances of inconsistent decisions. Overall, there was 81% agreement among the senior adjudicators on recommended eligibility determinations. For nine of the 13 cases, there had already been an official decision, and for these cases there was 62% agreement between the senior adjudicators and the official decision.
The 15 senior adjudicators were all DoD adjudicators. It’s my opinion that the 62% agreement between the senior adjudicators and the official decisions more closely reflects the degree of consistency in adjudications than the 81% agreement among the senior adjudicators. This is because I believe the “Hawthorne effect” influenced the results of the study. The original “official decision” on “very difficult cases” would have been made by senior or supervisory adjudicators.
Government-wide rules regarding security clearances are contained in Security Executive Agent Directives (SEAD) issued by the of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). These rules are applicable to all federal agencies—intelligence and non-intelligence. But it’s important to understand that not all federal agencies comply with all of the rules all of the time. Despite the fact that SEAD 7 requires reciprocal acceptance of investigations and clearances from other agencies, the three-letter Intelligence Community (IC) agencies often require applicants to undergo their own investigations. Even though SEAD 8 specifically requires “exceptional circumstances” and “justification” for “Temporary Eligibility” (Interim Clearances), some agencies (including DoD) automatically consider all security clearance applicants for interim clearances. Some agencies only consider applicants for certain positions for interim clearances, and other agencies don’t consider anyone for an interim clearance unless there’s a compelling need. Interim clearances can make the difference between being approved for access to classified information within two weeks or in a few months.
Even with problems in your background, you may be able to effectively complete a security clearance application form after reviewing information available at government and non-government websites. If you look for advice at a blog, try to find one where some of the contributors are current and former security clearance practitioners, like investigators, adjudicators, government security managers, and facility security officers. If obtaining an interim clearance is critical, you’ll probably want to seek advice from a trusted source. When the federal government intends to deny or revoke a security clearance, the applicant has a right to be “represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense.” This is stated in Presidential Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified Information.” Most federal departments and agencies (DoD, DHS, DoE, DoS, etc.) use the term “other representative” as used in EO 12968. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) uses the term “Personal Representative” to mean the same thing. The term “counsel” is used to mean an attorney.
A Personal Representative can be a friend, relative, work associate, union steward, or just about anyone. They should be someone you trust with your personal information and someone you feel can do a better job at presenting your case than you can. These are people who almost always help you for free, but like most things “In this world, you get what you pay for.” For a fee you can hire a personnel security consultant to be your Personal Representative. Depending on your needs, this can be somewhat expensive, but in most cases less expensive than hiring an attorney. Regardless of whether you choose a Personal Representative or an attorney to help you, the most important thing is to choose someone who thoroughly understands what needs to be done and how to do it. You wouldn’t choose a probate attorney to defend you in a murder case; don’t choose someone to represent you who doesn’t have experience with federal personnel security vetting.
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