The U.S. Department of Justice recently arrested two individuals, one a Chinese citizen and the other a naturalized U.S. citizen. The espionage case reads like a template stitched from prior failures, but this time the seams held longer. There was no classified download or theft of data; it was human intelligence (HUMINT) at its best, just proximity, persuasion, and a quiet harvest of open-source military information. What it lacked in flash, it made up for in fidelity to the Ministry of State Security’s evolving playbook. Lai a trusted citizen of the PRC, is unknown as to whether he is just a well-tooled cooperative contact or a non-official covered officer of the MSS. He was the conduit by which we saw the recruitment of an MSS access agent, and then through the paragraphs of the criminal complaint, we see the tasking, handling, and operational utility of a cooperative access agent in supporting ongoing operations and/or targeting U.S. naval personnel in hopes of achieving new sources.
Access agent recruited
This operation hinged on access, not clearance. From a residential foothold in Oregon, the recruited agent, Yuance Chen a naturalized U.S. citizen, was instructed, paid, and equipped to collect intelligence from outside the wire. Chen’s assignments, which included photographing naval installations, cultivating a Navy sailor, and orchestrating a $10,000 cash dead drop for a known MSS contact, mirror familiar outlines seen in earlier cases. From the SD-card exchanges of Edward Peng to the MAVNI penetration by Ji Chaoqun and the résumé harvesting of Dickson Yeo, this pattern is persistent: modest openings used to great effect.
Liren “Ryan” Lai, a PRC citizen, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in April 2025 and operated as the bridge between Chen and the MSS command layer. He handled logistics, travel, encrypted comms, and training in recruitment methodology. During in-person meetings in Guangzhou, MSS officers—including one referred to only as “Paul,” coached Chen on targeting military personnel by role and vulnerability and promised compensation. Photographs, audio recordings, and names of U.S. service members flowed back to Beijing.
What the complaint reveals, above all, is process discipline. Tradecraft that favors low exposure over fast payoff. Cash, not wires. Social channels, not networks. Everyday access, not infiltration.
“These charges reflect the breadth of the efforts by our foreign adversaries to target the United States — this time by conducting illegal intelligence-gathering operations aimed at our national security information and military service members,” said U.S. Attorney Craig H. Missakian for the Northern District of California. “My office and the FBI remain ever vigilant in guarding against these threats to the United States. We will continue to undertake counterespionage investigations and prosecutions, no matter how complex and sensitive, to disrupt attempts to weaken our national security.”
It is important to note that the U.S. servicemember who befriended Chen has not been identified or accused of any wrongdoing and indeed may have been the linchpin to the unraveling of the Chen-Lai MSS instance. We also do not know if Chen was Lai’s only target in the United States. We do know that the MSS tasked the duo with recruiting individuals within the U.S. military. It makes sense that they would be developing other targets.
Similarly, the mention of a former U.S. government employee who was paid $10,000 through the dead drop made by Chen’s wife while Chen was physically in China is another action worthy of approbation, yet left with many tentacles untethered. Who was this U.S. government employee? How did Chen’s wife come to have $10,000? Why Livermore, CA, the location of one of the nation’s premier national laboratories focused on nuclear research and development? It says something about China’s capabilities in the San Francisco Bay area, that they are mor comfortable using a surrogate than an undercover staff officer to handle asset support tasks, such as payments.
Security officers and counterintelligence professionals are encouraged to use this case as a teachable moment in future briefings. The Chen–Lai operation gives us a clear look at how MSS uses access agents and the continued use of social networks, to include LinkedIn, to connect with, evaluate, and attempt the recruitment of our personnel. As has been said many at time, one doesn’t get to choose if they are or are not a target of an adversary, the adversary is the only one with a vote. We can chose how we act and react when face-to-face with the adversary.
