On January 21, German authorities arrested Ilona W., a dual German-Ukrainian citizen, on charges of intelligence agent activities for a foreign power under § 99 of the German Criminal Code. Since at least November 2023, she allegedly maintained contacts with a handler at the Russian Embassy in Berlin, who operated for a Russian intelligence service. The information she passed included details on high-level political events related to the Russia-Ukraine war, arms industry locations, drone testing, and planned deliveries to Ukraine. She also aided her contact in attending Berlin events under false identities to cultivate further sources.
Access agent in action
Ilona W. held no position in any German government or intelligence agency; her access stemmed from personal acquaintances with former employees of the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg).
This instance is the classic case of HUMINT in action. The Russian intelligence officer (I/O) recruited an individual to elicit or otherwise obtain information of interest from her contacts within government and by extension their contacts via the social milieu.
Interestingly, she was able to obtain invites to events for her Russian I/O handler in various aliases (throw-away aliases no-doubt) which afforded the I/O the opportunity to slide up against targets of interest at these events. To aficionados of “The Americans” you saw this numerous times with Phillip and Elizabeth Jennings (KGB Illegals) worming their way into events to get next to their targets.
Germany counterintelligence challenges
This is not the first and it won’t be the last. It is, however, in line with Russian HUMINT modus operandi, where human intelligence collection is a 360-degree endeavor.
In December 2022 we saw the case of Carsten L., a BND technical reconnaissance director who leaked Ukraine invasion intercepts, cybersecurity details, and allied intel to the FSB for €450,000 via a diamond trader.
From 2024 to 2025, two Russian-German citizens Dieter S. and Alexander J. plotted sabotage against U.S. bases training Ukrainian forces. Authorities made six arrests in one month targeting aid disruptors, and three German-Russian nationals faced trial for espionage against American facilities.
Heightening CI posture against indirect recruitment
As noted above, Ilona W.’s facilitation of her handler’s alias-based entry to semi-private events highlights Russia’s recruitment of indirect-access individuals for two goals: (a) spotting and assessing potential sources in defense circles, and (b) enabling intelligence officers to target high-value contacts directly.
This approach uses personal networks, often diaspora or former affiliations, to evade formal perimeters and turn gatherings into venues to spot and assess.
FSOs and CI officers should ensure emphasis on the various means by which Russian (and others) utilize access agents to garner assessment information on their personnel. In addition, emphasis on the “WHY” behind reporting foreign contacts, in accordance with SEAD 3 is splayed upon the table with this case.
