The DOJ and the FBI highlighted a series of successes in thwarting the clandestine intelligence efforts of the People’s Republic of China operating within the United States. Some might say China’s intelligence apparatus got hit with a trifecta of good old fashion counterintelligence and counterespionage work by the FBI. Additionally, all doubt may now be removed, as if there was any, that Huawei is not protected by the PRC government. The two arrests, which occurred on October 20, were associated with the attempted forced repatriation of a Chinese national as part of the Chinese effort called, Operation Fox Hunt.
U.S. Attorney General Merrick B. Garland stated, “As these cases demonstrate, the government of China sought to interfere with the rights and freedoms of individuals in the United States and to undermine our judicial system that protects those rights. They did not succeed. The Justice Department will not tolerate attempts by any foreign power to undermine the Rule of Law upon which our democracy is based. We will continue to fiercely protect the rights guaranteed to everyone in our country. And we will defend the integrity of our institutions.”
Let’s look at the three inter-connected cases, all of which involve Chinese intelligence officers active in the United States.
China’s offensive operations in the United States
Four individuals were indicted for crimes associated with offensive intelligence operations in the United States of Chinese intelligence officers whose task was to recruit individuals in the “United States to act as agents of the PRC.” These individuals targeted members of academia, law enforcement, state officials and others. One of the Chinese cover entities was identified as “Institute for International Studies” which was used to engage those targets within the U.S. academic milieu.
FBI flips the scrip with double agentry
The value of double agents is well known in the counterintelligence world, and for good reason. They give those conducting counterespionage operations a window into the operational quiver of an adversary where many if not all the arrows at the adversary’s disposal can be seen.
A double agent, for those unfamiliar with the term, in this instance, is an individual whom the Chinese intelligence officers thought was fully recruited and under their operational control when in reality the individual was operating at the behest and direction of the FBI.
With adroit handling of the double agent, the FBI was able to pull back multiple layers of the operational M.O. of the Chinese intelligence apparatus, including identifying individual operation officers who are operating within the United States.
China intel attempt to protect Huawei
Let’s get into why the Chinese intel officers were attempting to recruit a U.S. government employee (based on the description in the court criminal complaint, the individual was most likely an employee of the DOJ).
The DOJ statement says it succinctly, “Dong He, aka Guochun He and aka Jacky He, and Zheng Wang, aka Zen Wang, allegedly orchestrated a scheme to steal files and other information from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York related to the ongoing federal criminal investigation and prosecution of a global telecommunications company (Company-1 – believed to be Huawei) based in the PRC, including by paying a $41,000 Bitcoin bribe to a U.S. government employee who the defendants believed had been recruited to work for the PRC, but who in fact was a double agent working on behalf of the FBI.”
China first set its sights on government employee, in February 2017. The individual subsequently (date not provided) became a double agent for the FBI. In response to tasking, including tasking to provide sensitive government trial information, the double agent provided to the Chinese what appeared to have been court documents and prosecution notes, but were in reality feed materials prepared for this explicit purpose.
The footnote of the criminal complaint tells us, “The two documents described in this affidavit that (double agent) obtained and passed to HE and WANG were actually prepared by the government for purposes of this investigation and were neither taken from any document related to the prosecution of Company-1 nor actually classified as “SECRET.” Furthermore, the information set forth below that was provided by (double agent) to HE and WANG does not accurately recount actual meetings, communications, or other strategy related to the prosecution of Company-1.”
The double agent, we learn from the court documents used an encrypted messaging system to communicate with the Chinese intel officers.
We also learned that the information being provided by the double agent was being provided to Huawei, and the information was of great interest. The Chinese pressed for the names of cooperating witnesses. Given what is to follow, the cases involving forced repatriation, one does not have to do high-level math to understand, that with those names, the PRC had the means to intimidate witnesses into silence. Similarly, the desire to know DOJ’s trial strategy was a topic of great interest and the information provided (again to remind, controlled information) was accepted with great interest by the Chinese intel officers.
China’s attempts at forced repatriation
Quanzhong An and Guangyang An were arrested on Thursday, October 20 for acting as illegal agents of a foreign government, China. The two were part of a larger group of individuals, similarly charged, who remain at large, in an eight-count indictment alleging they conspired to ”to conduct surveillance of and engage in a campaign to harass and coerce a U.S. resident to return to the PRC as part of an international extralegal repatriation effort known as “Operation Fox Hunt.”
The full DOJ press release, including links to court documents, is available here.
